Smoothed Efficient Algorithms and Reductions for Network Coordination
  Games by Boodaghians, Shant et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
02
28
0v
4 
 [c
s.C
C]
  2
6 F
eb
 20
19
Smoothed Efficient Algorithms and Reductions for Network
Coordination Games
Shant Boodaghians, Rucha Kulkarni, and Ruta Mehta∗
Department of Computer Science,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
{boodagh2,ruchark2}@illinois.edu, rutamehta@cs.illinois.edu
Abstract
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need
for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure
Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a PLS-complete problem in the worst case.
This is a potential game where the sequential-better-response algorithm is known to converge
to a pure NE, albeit in exponential time. First, we prove polynomial (resp. quasi-polynomial)
smoothed complexity when the underlying game graph is a complete (resp. arbitrary) graph, and
every player has constantly many strategies. We note that the complete graph case is reminiscent
of perturbing all parameters, a common assumption in most known smoothed analysis results.
Second, we define a notion of smoothness-preserving reduction among search problems, and
obtain reductions from 2-strategy network coordination games to local-max-cut, and from k-
strategy games (with arbitrary k) to local-max-cut up to two flips. The former together with
the recent result of Bibak et al. [2018] gives an alternate O(n8)-time smoothed algorithm for
the 2-strategy case. This notion of reduction allows for the extension of smoothed efficient
algorithms from one problem to another.
For the first set of results, we develop techniques to bound the probability that an (adversar-
ial) better-response sequence makes slow improvements on the potential. Our approach combines
and generalizes the local-max-cut approaches of Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Angel et al. [2017]
to handle the multi-strategy case: it requires a careful definition of the matrix which captures
the increase in potential, a tighter union bound on adversarial sequences, and balancing it with
good enough rank bounds. We believe that the approach and notions developed herein could be
of interest in addressing the smoothed complexity of other potential and/or congestion games.
∗This work was supported by NSF grant CCF-1750436
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1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts of game theory. Extensive work
within Algorithmic Game Theory has brought significant insights to the computational complexity
of finding Nash equilibria (NE) in various game models (see Section 1.2 for a detailed discussion).
Most problems of this form are shown to be complete for some class in “Total-Function NP”1, typ-
ically for either PPAD or PLS e.g., Fabrikant et al. [2004], Daskalakis et al. [2009], Chen et al.
[2006a,b], Skopalik and Vo¨cking [2008], Kannan and Theobald [2010], Etessami and Yannakakis
[2010], Syrgkanis [2010], Mehta [2014]. The class PPAD captures problems with parity arguments
like finding fixed-points of functions, Sperner’s Lemma, and finding (mixed) Nash equilibria in gen-
eral games Papadimitriou [1994], Kintali et al. [2013], Daskalakis et al. [2009], Chen et al. [2006a],
Goldberg [2011], while PLS (Polynomial Local Search) captures problems with local-search algo-
rithms, like local-max-cut, local-max-SAT, and pure NE in potential games Johnson et al. [1988],
Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis [1991], Fabrikant et al. [2004], Skopalik and Vo¨cking [2008], Cai and Daskalakis
[2011].
Although it is well accepted that PPAD and PLS are unlikely to be in P Beame et al. [1998],
Bitansky et al. [2015], Rubinstein [2017], problems in these classes admit respectively path-following
style complementary pivot algorithms Lemke and Howson [1964], Govindan and Wilson [2003],
Adsul et al. [2011], Garg et al. [2011] and local-search-type algorithms Johnson et al. [1988]. The
natural local-search algorithms for PLS problems have been observed to be empirically fast Johnson et al.
[1988], Codenotti et al. [2008], Deligkas et al. [2016a]. However, these algorithms take exponential
time in the worst case Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis [1991], Savani and von Stengel [2004]. A similar
phenomenon occurs with the classical Simplex method for solving Linear Programs. To study this
case, Spielman and Teng introduced a powerful model of Smoothed analysis, which “continuously
interpolates between the worst-case and average-case analyses of algorithms,” Spielman and Teng
[2004]. The basic idea is to formally show that adversarial instances are “sparse and scattered,” in
a probabilistic sense. This gives rise to the following question:
Question. Can we design smoothed efficient algorithms for finding Nash equilibria?
In this paper we answer the question in the affirmative for network-coordination games, a well-
studied model (see e.g. Cai and Daskalakis [2011] and Simon and Wojtczak [2016]) which succinctly
captures pairwise coordination in multi-player games. We obtain smoothed (quasi-)polynomial time
algorithms to find pure Nash equilibria (PNE) in network-coordination games (NetCoordNash) with
constantly many strategies, a PLS-complete problem in the worst case Cai and Daskalakis [2011].
Smoothed Analysis. The work of Spielman and Teng Spielman and Teng [2004] introduced the
smoothed analysis framework to study good empirical performance of classical Simplex method
for linear programs (LP). They showed that introducing independent random perturbations to
any given (adversarial) LP instance, ensures that the Simplex method terminates fast with high
probability (here the run-time depends inverse polynomially in the perturbation magnitude). Per-
formance on such probabilistic instance has since been known as smoothed complexity of the problem
– one of the strongest guarantees one can hope for beyond worst-case. In the past decade and a
half, much work has sought to obtain smoothed efficient algorithms when worst-case efficiency
seems infeasible Damerow et al. [2003], Beier and Vo¨cking [2004], Manthey and Reischuk [2005],
1TFNP, A class of search problems in the intersection of NP and co-NP.
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Ro¨glin and Vo¨cking [2007], Arthur and Vassilvitskii [2009], Englert et al. [2014], Etscheid and Ro¨glin
[2017], Angel et al. [2017], including for integer programming, binary search trees, iterative-closest-
point (ICP) algorithms, the 2-OPT algorithm for the Traveling Salesman problem (TSP), the
knapsack problem, and the local-max-cut problem.
In case of Nash equilibrium (NE) computation, smoothed complexity of two-player games is
known to not lie in P unless RP = PPAD Chen et al. [2006a], which follows from the hardness of
1/poly additive approximation. On the contrary, for most PLS-complete problems, the natural
local-search algorithm often finds an additive-approximate solution efficiently. There is always a
“potential function” that the algorithm improves in each step. Intuitively, until an approximate
solution is reached, the algorithm will improve the associated potential function significantly in
every local-search step.
The potential function is also reminiscent of the objective function of LP’s. This allows one to
perform smoothed analysis of FLIP algorithm for local-max-cut, a classical PLS-complete problem.
Here, given a weighted graph, the goal is to find a cut that can not be improved by moving a single
vertex across the cut. The algorithm FLIPs the partition of any one vertex in one step if this im-
proves the cut.2 First, Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017] showed that FLIP terminates in quasi-polynomial
time with high probability, when the edge weights are perturbed. A recent second result by Angel,
Bubeck, Peres, and Wei Angel et al. [2017] showed polynomial run-time for the same algorithm
when the weights of all edges are perturbed, viewing missing edges as zero-weight edges. We note
that the simultaneous perturbation of all input parameters seems to be crucial in getting smoothed
polynomial time algorithms so far, e.g., see Blum and Dunagan [2002], Spielman and Teng [2004],
Sankar et al. [2006].
Summary of Our Results. Motivated by the above intuition and results, we study the smoothed
complexity of NetCoordNash, which we recall is also PLS-complete. An instance of NetCoordNash
is represented by an undirected game graph G = (V,E), where the nodes are the players, and every
node v ∈ V plays a two-player coordination game with each of its neighbors. If every player has k
strategies to choose from, then the game on each edge (u, v) can be represented by a k × k payoff
matrix Auv. Once every player chooses a strategy, the payoff value for each edge is fixed, and each
player gets the sum of the payoffs on its incident edges. The goal is to find a pure NE of this
game. We analyze the problem through two different approaches: (i) direct smoothed analysis of
an algorithm (see Section A), and (ii) through reductions (Section C).
We first analyze a local-search algorithm called better-response (BRA), where players take turns
making improving moves (termed better-response moves). The sum of payoffs across all the edges
acts as a potential function measuring the progress of the algorithm, i.e. the function value increases
every time a player makes a better-response move (Section 2.1).
We show that, when k is constant, then for games where for all (u, v) ∈ E, all payoff entries
of Auv are perturbed independently at random, any better-response algorithm converges in quasi-
polynomial time with high probability (Theorem A.12). Furthermore, if G is a complete graph
and any two players participate in a random game Auv, then the algorithm takes polynomial time
with high probability (Theorem A.10). To show these results, we develop a technique to bound
the probability that a sufficiently long sequence of better-response moves makes little improvement
to the potential function. This technique may be applicable to analyze the smoothed complexity
2Note that, unlike max-cut, if all edge weights are poly(n), assuming they are integers, then FLIP finds a local-
max-cut in polynomial time. This indicates the existence of many “easy” instances “near” any given instance. Similar
is the case with other PLS-complete game problems too.
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]
Figure 1: Local-max-cut to 2-strategy network-coordination games: mapping of edge (u, v).
of other potential games. Apart from party affiliation games, for which efficient smoothed com-
plexity directly follows from local-max-cut Fabrikant et al. [2004], to the best of our knowledge, no
smoothed efficient algorithm for a worst-case hard Nash equilibrium problem was known prior to
this work.
Our analysis combines and extends the approaches for local-max-cut Angel et al. [2017], Etscheid and Ro¨glin
[2017]; as discussed in Section 1.1. Local-max-cut reduces to a special case of 2-strategy network-
coordination games Cai and Daskalakis [2011] (see Figure 1), therefore handling the more general
setting of network-coordination game with multiple strategies poses some challenges.
Our second set of results analyzes smoothed complexity through reductions. To extend a
smoothed efficient algorithm from one problem to another, the usual notion of reduction does
not suffice. Among other things, it needs to ensure that independent perturbations of the param-
eters of the original problem produce independent perturbations of all parameters in the reduced
problem. Based on this we define smoothness-preserving reduction (see Theorem C.1), and ob-
tain two such reductions: (i) from 2-strategy network-coordination games to local-max-cut, and
(ii) general k-strategy network-coordination games to local-max-cut up-to-2-flips. (i.e. cuts whose
value cannot be improved by moving any two vertices) (see Theorem C.4). We show that the first
reduction, together with smoothed efficient algorithms for local-max-cut gives alternate smoothed
efficient algorithms for the 2-strategy network-coordination game; in particular, the recent result of
Bibak et al. [2018] gives an O(n8) algorithm. For general network-coordination games, polynomial
smoothed complexity of local-max-cut up-to-two-flips, where the local improvement algorithm flips
two vertices in every step, needs to be shown. We leave this as an open question.
1.1 Smoothed Algorithms: Challenges and Techniques
Our results follow a framework which is common to past work on smoothed algorithms for local
max cut Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Angel et al. [2017], Bibak et al. [2018] (see Section 3.1). The
goal is to show that with high probability every sufficiently long sequence of improving moves (of
the local-search algorithm) is very likely to significantly improve the potential. This is shown via
a two-step process hinging on Lemma A.1: first, we represent the potential improvement in every
step as a linear combination of the input parameters and consider the corresponding matrix for
a subsequence, and second, show a tight union bound on the number of different sequences and
relevant initial configurations, paired with a high rank-bound for the matrix.
Several obstacles were encountered while trying to apply the general framework to the k-
NetCoordNash problem. The first was how to correctly represent each move in a better-response
(BR) sequence. Specifying only the moving player is insufficient, as every player has more than
2 strategies to choose from. A move is entirely specified by the triple (player, strategy-from,
strategy-to). This, however, is too descriptive and the union bound is too large. Labelling as
(player, to-strategy) suffices, and strikes the right balance between rank and union bound. This
definition, however, muddies the proof technique further on.
• Rank analysis: When the BR sequence represents moves as (player, strategy) pairs, within
a sequence, some pairs may be repeated, and some players may be repeated, but always
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playing distinct strategies. Therefore, notions of repeating and non-repeating players need
to be carefully defined. Secondly, we would want the nodes in the directed-influence-graph
arguments of Section 3.3.2, used for showing rank bounds in terms of repeat-moves, to also be
labeled as (player,strategy) pairs. This would have multiple nodes in the graph corresponding
to the same players, each influencing multiple players. This makes for messy analysis and
poor rank bounds. We instead label the nodes of these influence graphs as simply the players,
unlike the improving sequence itself. This causes rank bounds to depend on the number of
players with repeating moves, rather than the number of repeating moves. Thus, notions of
critical subsequences and separated blocks need to be carefully adapted from past notions.
• Defining critical subsequences and separated blocks: We show that moves by non-
repeating players allow us to “separate” the sequence and combine the rank bounds from both
sides. This leads to the notion of separated blocks, which requires a careful selection of the
boundary moves. To combine these bounds, we use the idea of a critical block from Angel et al.
[2017], which was very important to their poly-time bound, and is similarly helpful in our
result. It would have been preferable to use any non-repeated move as the separators, but it
is not possible to do so, as the same player may also repeat other moves. These notions must
be adapted carefully so that the rank and union bounds balance each other. This, overall,
loosens the rank bound.
• Union bounds: The union bound analysis must now bear the brunt of the looser rank
bounds above, and must be made tighter through properties of the k-NetCoordNash problem.
Eliminating the influence of the inactive players allows us to avoid having to take their
strategies into account. Taking a sum of repeated moves does not suffice in our setting, and
we define the notion of “cyclic sums” to handle this.
1.2 Related Work
The works most related to ours are Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017] and Angel et al. [2017] analyzing
smoothed complexity of local-max-cut; see Section 1.1 for a detailed comparison. Independently,
Bibaksereshkeh, Carlson, and Chandrasekaran Bibak et al. [2018] improved the running-time for
the local-max-cut algorithm, and obtained smoothed polynomial and quasi-polynomial algorithms
for local-3-cut and local-k-cut with constant k respectively. Reduction of Figure 1 easily extends
to reduce local-k-cut to k-strategy network-coordination games, implying that the latter signifi-
cantly generalizes the former. However, the reduction is not smoothness-preserving, and hence our
smoothed efficient algorithm is not directly applicable to solve the local-k-cut problem.
Beyond-worst case complexity of NE computation. The smoothed-efficient algorithm for
local-max-cut directly gives one for party affiliation games Fabrikant et al. [2004]. For two-player
games which are non-potential in general, Chen, Deng, and Teng Chen et al. [2006a] ruled out
polynomial smoothed complexity unless RP=PPAD. While, towards average case analysis Ba´ra´ny,
Vempala, and Vetta Ba´ra´ny et al. [2007] showed that a game picked uniformly at random has a NE
with support size two for both the players whp. The average case complexity of a random potential
game was shown to be polynomial in the number of players and strategies by Durand and Gaujal
Durand and Gaujal [2016].
Worst-case analysis. Potential games and equivalently congestion games have been studied
at length (e.g., Rosenthal [1973], Monderer and Shapley [1996], Roughgarden and Tardos [2002],
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Fabrikant et al. [2004], Chakrabarty et al. [2005]), capturing routing and traffic situations (e.g.,
Smith [1979], Dafermos and Nagurney [1984], Roughgarden [2007], Hoefer and Souza [2010], Harks et al.
[2013], Anshelevich et al. [2003]), and resource allocation under strategic agents (e.g., Johari and Tsitsiklis
[2004], Feldman and Tamir [2012a,b]). Unlike general games, existence of the potential function
ensures that these games always have a pure NE Rosenthal [1973]. Finding pure NE is typi-
cally PLS-complete Fabrikant et al. [2004], Cai and Daskalakis [2011], while finding any NE, mixed
or pure, is known to be in CLS Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [2011], a class in the intersection
of PPAD and PLS. A remarkable collection of work studies the loss in welfare at NE through
the notions of Price-of-Anarchy and Price-of-Stability (e.g., Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999],
Roughgarden and Tardos [2002], Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [2005], Aland et al. [2006], Anshelevich et al.
[2008], Andelman et al. [2009], Roughgarden et al. [2017]). Our approach should help provide ways
to obtain smoothed efficient algorithms for these games.
Worst case complexity of NE computation in general non-potential games has been studied
extensively. The computation is typically PPAD-complete, even for various special cases (e.g.,
Abbott et al. [2005], Chen et al. [2006b], Mehta [2014], Feige and Talgam-Cohen [2010]) and ap-
proximation (e.g., Chen et al. [2006a], Rubinstein [2018]). On the other hand efficient algorithms
have been designed for interesting sub-classes (e.g., Kannan and Theobald [2007], Tsaknakis and Spirakis
[2007], Immorlica et al. [2011], Adsul et al. [2011], Cai and Daskalakis [2011], Cai et al. [2015],
Ahmadinejad et al. [2016], Balcan and Braverman [2017], Barman [2018]), exploiting the structure
of NE for the class to either enumerate, or through other methods such as parameterized LP and
binary search. For two-player games, Lipton, Mehta, and Markakis gave a quasi-polynomial time
algorithm to find a constant approximate Nash equilibrium Lipton et al. [2003]. Recently, Rubin-
stein Rubinstein [2017] showed this to be the best possible assuming exponential time hypothesis for
PPAD, and Kothari and Mehta Kothari and Mehta [2018] showed a matching unconditional hard-
ness under the powerful algorithmic framework of Sum-of-Squares with oblivious rounding and enu-
meration. These results are complemented by communication Babichenko and Rubinstein [2017],
Go¨o¨s and Rubinstein [2018] and query complexity lower bounds Babichenko [2016], Goldberg and Roth
[2016], Fearnley and Savani [2016]. Lower bounds in approximation under well-accepted assump-
tions have been studied for the decision versions Gilboa and Zemel [1989], Conitzer and Sandholm
[2008], Hazan and Krauthgamer [2011], Braverman et al. [2015], Deligkas et al. [2016b].
2 Game Model, Smoothed Analysis, and Statement of Results
We introduce here the model we consider for Network Coordination Games, the notion of smoothed
analysis, and state our main contributions.
Notation: In what follows, [k] denotes {1, . . . , k}, and 〈., .〉 is the inner product.
2.1 Nash Equilibria in Network Coordination Games
A game with two players, where each player has k strategies, can be defined by two k × k payoff
matrices (A,B), one for each player. It is called a coordination game if A = B. We assume without
loss of generality that every player has the same number of strategies.
k-network-coordination game. A network-coordination game is a multi-player extension of
coordination games. The game is specified by an underlying undirected graphG = (V,E), where the
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nodes are players, and each edge represents a two-player coordination game between its endpoints.
A k-network-coordination game is where each player has k strategies, and the edge games are
represented by k × k matrices Auv. If u plays i ∈ [k] and v plays j ∈ [k] then both get payoff
Au,v(i, j) on this edge; we will sometimes denote this by A((u, i)(v, j)) to disambiguate. Nash
equilibria are invariant to shifting and scaling of the payoffs, so w.l.o.g. we assume every entry of
Auv is contained in [−1, 1]. Let n = |V |. A strategy profile is a vector σ ∈ [k]n where each player
chooses a strategy from [k]. The payoff of player u is then:
payoffu(σ) :=
∑
v: uv∈E Auv(σu, σv)
Nash Equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium (NE) no player gains by deviating unilaterally. In
general, NE strategy profiles may be randomized. However, a NE where every player chooses a
strategy deterministically is called pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). Formally, strategy profile σ is
a PNE, if and only if ∀u ∈ V, payoffu(σ) ≥ payoffu(σ′u,σ−u), ∀σ′u ∈ [k], where σ−u denotes
the strategies of all the players in σ except u. In Potential Games Rosenthal [1973], PNE’s are
known to always exist. Such a game admits a potential function which encodes the individual
“progress” of the players, i.e. ∃g : [k]n → R such that for all σ ∈ [k]n, g(σ) − g(σ′u,σ−u) =
payoffu(σ)− payoffu(σ′u,σ−u), ∀u,∀σ′u ∈ [k]. Clearly, every local-maximum of g, i.e. σ such that
g(σ) ≥ g(σ′u,σ−u), ∀u,∀σ′u ∈ [k], is a pure NE.
Lemma 2.1 (Cai and Daskalakis [2011]). Network Coord. Games are potential games with poten-
tial function
payoff(σ) =
∑
(u,v)∈E Auv(σu, σv) =
1
2
∑
u∈V payoffu(σ) (1)
Our goal is to find a pure NE for a given k-network-coordination game.
Better-Response Algorithm (BR alg., or BRA). Another immediate consequence of being
a potential game is that, for any strategy profile σ, if some player u can deviate to σ′u and improve
her payoff, then the move σu 7→ σ′u is termed a better-response (BR) move for player u from
strategy profile σ. Clearly, under such a BR move, the potential function value increases, i.e.,
payoff(σ′u,σ−u)− payoff(σ) = payoffu(σ′u,σ−u)− payoffu(σ) > 0.
Note that payoff(σ) may only take kn possible values. Hence, if a BR move is made whenever
possible, the players must converge to a local optimum of the potential function, or equivalently,
to a pure NE of the game. This gives a local-search based better-response algorithm to solve
k-NetCoordNash.
2.2 Smoothed Analysis and Reductions
The notion of smoothed analysis was introduced by Spielman and Teng Spielman and Teng [2004]
to bridge the gap between average- and worst-case analysis. For a search problem P let (I,X) be
an instance where I is possibly discrete information, and X is a real-valued vector whose dimension
depends on I. For example, in the case of a k-network-coordination game, I consists of the game
graph G and the number of strategies k, and X is the payoff vector A.
Definition 2.1 (Polynomial Smoothed Complexity w.h.p. or in expectation). Let (I,X) be a
random instance of P, where I is chosen arbitrarily, and X is a random real-valued vector whose
entries are independent and have density at most φ. If there exists an algorithm which solves
arbitrary instances of P in finite time, and for all I, solves the random input (I,X) in time at most
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(φ · |I| · |X|)c for some c > 0 with probability at least 1− 1/poly(φ, |I|, |X|), where |X| denotes the
number of entries in X, then P is said to have polynomial smoothed complexity w.h.p. If the same
holds in expectation, then P is said to have polynomial smoothed complexity in expectation.
Standard (Turing) reductions between two search problems P and Q are well-defined, and used
to extend an algorithm of Q to solve instances of P, or to imply hardness for Q given hardness for
P. We extend this notion to define smoothness preserving reductions.
Definition 2.2 (Strong andWeak Smoothness-Preserving Reductions). A randomized, smoothness-
preserving reduction from a search problem P to Q is defined by poly-time computable functions
f1, f2, and f3, and a real probability space Ω ⊆ Rd, such that,
• For any (I,X) ∈ P, and for arbitrary R ∈ Ω, (f1(I), f2(X,R)) is an instance of Q, such that
all (locally optimal) solutions σ map to a solution f3(σ) of (I,X).
• Whenever the entries of X and R are drawn independently at random from distributions with
density at most φ, then f2(X,R) has entries which are independent random variables with
density at most poly(φ, |X|, |R|). This is called a strong reduction.
• If the entries of f2(X,R) instead of being independent are linearly independent combinations
of entries of X and R, and the density is similarly bounded, then call it a weak reduction.
d-FlipMaxCut. Extending the notion of local-max-cut Scha¨ffer and Yannakakis [1991], we define
the d-FlipMaxCut problem, given by an undirected graph G = (V,E) with edge weights wuv
for all uv ∈ E. The goal is to find a non-empty subset S ( V of vertices, such that δ(S) :=∑
uv∈E:u∈S,v/∈S wuv is a local optimum up to d-flips, i.e., δ(S) ≥ δ(S′) for all S′ ⊂ V such that S
and S′ differ by at most d vertices, or |(S \ S′) ∪ (S′ \ S)| ≤ d. Note that, 1-FlipMaxCut is the
usual local-max-cut problem.
For a constant d, the d-FlipMaxCut problem admits a natural FLIP algorithm, which like the
BR algorithm, will check whether there exists a local improvement, and move the candidate solution
to the improved solution until no local improvement is possible.
3 Overview of Our Results and Techniques
In this section, we give a high-level overview of the proof method and formally state the results of
the paper. The following Sections A–C provide the details for these proofs. As discussed above,
our results are twofold: first, we extend pre-existing proof methods to directly show that the BRA
terminates in smoothed polynomial time, and second, we introduce the notion of a smoothness-
preserving reduction which allows us to give an alternate algorithm for 2-NetCoordNash, and a
conditional one for k-NetCoordNash. We begin with a formal definition of the smoothed problem:
Smoothed k-NetCoordNash. Given a k-network-coordination game given as an undirected
graph G = (V,E) and an (|E|k2)-dimensional payoff vector A, where the entries of A are indepen-
dent random variables supported on [−1, 1] with density at most φ, find a PNE.
Since the real-valued input to the smoothed problem is stochastic, the running time of an
algorithm for it will be as well, and the guarantees will be stated either w.h.p. or in expectation
(Definition 2.1). The proof of smoothed-poly running time falls within a framework which has been
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used in the past to show smoothed-polynomial running time for the FLIP algorithm in local-max-
cut Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Angel et al. [2017], Bibak et al. [2018], and can also be applied
to other local-improvement potential-descent algorithms. This section begins with an overview of
this common framework, then proceeds to explain how the required bounds may be shown in our
setting.
3.1 A Common Framework for Local-Improvement Algorithms
Observe that the potential function for k-NetCoordNash, as given in (1), is an integer linear com-
bination of the payoff values, and is actually a 0–1 combination. The following framework can be
applied whenever this holds, as long as the potential function’s range is also polynomially bounded.
It hinges on the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 (Ro¨glin [2008]). Let X ∈ Rd be a vector of d independent random variables where
each Xi has density bounded by φ. Let α1, . . . , αr be r linearly independent vectors in Z
d. then the
joint density of (〈αi,X〉)i∈[r] is bounded by φr, and for any given b1, b2, . . . ∈ R and ǫ > 0,
Pr
[∧r
i=1 〈αi,X〉 ∈ [bi, bi + ǫ]
]
≤ (φǫ)r (2)
Here, X constitutes the random inputs to the smoothed problem, and the α vectors represent the
change in the potential function. Formally, if a potential function Φ(σ) is given for some problem,
and σ1,σ2,σ3, . . . denotes the walk through the state space given by some local-improvement
algorithm, then we have vectors αi such that 〈αi,X〉 = Φ(σi) − Φ(σi−1) for all i. Setting bi = 0,
the above lemma upper bounds the probability that every step of the local-improvement algorithm
is only a small improvement (〈α,X〉 < ǫ), while still being an improvement (〈α,X〉 > 0).
Let E be the event in the probability statement, that is, ∧ri=1 〈αi,X〉 ∈ [0, 0 + ǫ]. If E does not
hold, and the sequence is indeed an improving one, then at least one of the improvements must be
at least ǫ. If E does not hold for any sequence of Ω(n) moves, then we can bound the running time
of the iterative algorithm by
n
ǫ
·
(
max
σ
Φ(σ) −min
σ
Φ(σ)
)
Finally, if Φ is bounded in a (quasi)polynomially-sized range, and ǫ is taken to be 1/(quasi)poly(n),
then we conclude that the procedure runs in (quasi)polynomial time.
Rank Bound vs Union Bound. Note that in order to get (quasi)polynomial running time
with high probability, we must first upper-bound the probability of event E , simultaneously for
all sequences of Ω(n) local-improvement moves, for which we simply take the union bound. To
counteract this large union bound, we must lower-bound the rank of the matrix [αi]
n
i=1. It remains
then to choose ǫ correctly to counteract the union bound, and proving the best rank in general.
This highlights the main technical challenge when applying the common framework: labelling
the moves. If a move’s label is too descriptive — e.g. a full state vector — then the union bound
will be much too large. However, if a move’s label is too vague — e.g. denoting a move only by
the player who is moving, not the strategy — then the rank bound will not be large enough. We
introduce, in the next section, those parameters which work in our setting. At a high-level, our
analysis follows the framework of the previous local-max-cut papers Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017],
Angel et al. [2017]. However, since players have multiple strategies, this poses some challenges for
the technical details. We keep notation consistent whenever possible, to allow making analogies to
past approaches.
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3.2 Notation
Recall the problem of k-NetCoordNash defined above, and the better-response algorithm (BRA)
discussed in Section 2.1. We represent each better-response (BR) move by a player-strategy pair
(u, i), denoting that player u is replacing strategy σu by i, (assuming i 6= σu). We also denote as σt
the strategy profile after the tth BR move. Formally, σ0 is the initial strategy profile, and if the
move at time t is given by (ut, it), then σ
t := (it,σ
t−1
−ut). The change in the potential function at this
step is then given by payoff(σt) − payoff(σt−1), which is clearly an integer linear combination of
the Auv(i, j) payoff values. Since the combinations have integer coefficients, and the payoff values
have density bounded by φ, then the total improvement (a random variable) has density at most
φ as well. For any fixed BR sequence S of length 2nk, we define these linear combinations as the
set of vectors L = {L1, L2, . . . }, where Lt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(|E|×k2),∀t ∈ [2nk], with entries indexed by
each of the payoff values. The values of its entries are chosen as follows:
Lt((u, i), (v, j)) =

1 if: ut ∈ {u, v} and σtu = i and σtv = j.
−1 if: ut ∈ {u, v} and σt−1u = i and σt−1v = j.
0 otherwise.
That is, every entry signifies whether the corresponding payoff value remains unchanged (0), or
gets added (1) or removed (−1) from the potential function. The inner product 〈Lt, A〉 gives the
change in the total payoff of the player who makes a move at time t, and thus, the increase in
potential due to the tth move.
Each of the inner products 〈Lt, A〉 can be shown to be unlikely to take values in the range (0, ǫ]
by the assumption of bounded density. To argue that L has high rank, we partition all players who
make a move in the sequence into two sets: those players who never play the same strategy twice
throughout the whole sequence (non-repeating players), and those who do (repeating players). We
will denote these quantities as p1 and p2 respectively, and define p = p1 + p2. Furthermore, since
we will sometimes have to refer to players, and other times to moves, we denote as d the number
of distinct (player,strategy) pairs which appear in the sequence, and let q0 denote the number of
players which play a “return move,” that is, moves where a player returns to their original strategy.
Note that for any sequence of moves S, we have
p(S) ≤ d(S) ≤ k · p(S), q0(S) ≤ p2(S), q0(S) ≤ d(S)/2.
We also introduce the quantity d1, which is the number of (distinct) moves by all non-repeating
players, so p1 ≤ d1 ≤ k · p1.
3.3 Smoothed Polynomial Complexity, Rank Bounds, and Union Bounds
Recall the definition of the smoothed k-NetCoordNash defined above. The first main contribution
of this paper is to show the following result:
Theorem 3.2. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash on a complete game graph, and with
an arbitrary initial strategy profile, then any execution of BRA, where improvements are chosen
arbitrarily, will converge to a PNE in at most (nkφ)O(k) steps, with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k, φ).
We also have convergence in (nkφ)O(k) moves in expectation, as shown in theorem 3.4, discussed
below. Note that the probability value in the above statement is over the possible choices of payoff
values for the network-coordination game, and not over executions of the BR algorithm. This
statement holds true regardless of how BRA is implemented, even adversarially. The complete
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game graph condition requires that any two players in this game share an edge in the game graph,
and the payoff matrix for a non-existing game edge is not a fixed, all-zeros matrix, but is instead
a random payoff matrix like all other edges. This completeness technicality fits the model of most
known smoothed polynomial-time algorithms (e.g. Spielman and Teng [2004], Sankar et al. [2006],
Englert et al. [2014], Angel et al. [2017], Bibak et al. [2018]) which require every parameter to be
perturbed. We will later discuss results in the case of incomplete graphs, where missing edges are
assumed to be 0-payoff games and are unperturbed.
Theorem 3.2 is shown using the “common framework” from Section 3.1. The random input
is the set of (random) payoff matrices {Auv}u,v∈G, and the “α” vectors are the columns of the L
matrix as defined in Section 3.2 for a BR sequence of length 2nk. If all of the n players appear in
the sequence S, then as shown in Corollary A.3, L has rank at least (1− 1n) (d(S)−q0(S)) ≥ n−1.
Therefore, any sequence where every player is present is “good” with probability (φǫ)n−1, where
a sequence is “good” if it contains either a non-improving move, or a move which improves the
potential by at least ǫ.
Case I. All Players Active. Recall from Section 3.1 that we wish to take the union bound
over all sequences of length Ω(n). In fact, for this result, we will consider sequences of length
2nk. Since there are n players, there are kn possible initial configurations of the players, and
(nk)2nk possible sequences, so with probability 1 − (nk)O(nk)(φǫ)Ω(n), all linear-length sequences
are “good.” Setting ǫ = 1/φ(nk)O(k) suffices to have the probability of success be 1− 1/poly(n, k).
Since −n2 ≤ payoff(σ) ≤ n2, then with probability 1 − 1/poly(n), the BRA must terminate in at
most 2n2/ǫ = φ · (nk)O(k) many iterations, as desired.
Case II. Few Players Active. However, it is not always the case that there are n active players,
or even Ω(n) active players in a given sequence of length 2nk. A player is active if they appear
in the sequence, and otherwise, inactive. We will show, in the following sections, rank bounds
which depend on the p1, p2, q0, and d values, as defined in Section 3.2. As we will discuss, these
ranks will not be sufficiently large to handle the na¨ıve union bound described above. The following
table summarizes the bound we show in each case, and the resulting success probability, under the
assumption p(S) ≤ ℓ = 2(d(S) − q(S)) ≤ k · p(S), where ℓ is sequence length, and p1(S) ≤ d1(S).
Case Rank Bound Union Bound Probability of Success
p1 ≥ p2 d(S)− q0(S) + d1(S)/2 kp(S)(4n/ǫ)d(S)−q0(S)(nk)ℓ 1− (nkφ)O(k·p(S))ǫp(S)/4
p2 ≥ p1 p2(S)/2 kp(S)(nk)ℓ 1− (nk)O(k·p(S))(ℓφǫ)p(S)/4
And so, setting ǫ = 1/(nkφ)O(k) suffices in both cases for good success probability. We later show
why ℓ = 2(d(S) − q0(S)) suffices. The other inequalities follow by definition.
3.3.1 Mostly Non-Repeating Players, and a Union Bound via Bucketing
Recall, a non-repeating player is one who plays each strategy at most once throughout the better-
response sequence, including the initial strategy at the beginning of the sequence. Non-repeating
players are key to showing rank bounds in the following sense:
Rank Bounds through Separated Blocks. Let v be some non-repeating player, and suppose
the τ -th move is (v, σ). Let τ ′ be the next move of v. Then we must have that ((v, σ)(∗, ∗))
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entries of Lt can only be nonzero for τ ≤ t ≤ τ ′, and at least one of these entries must be nonzero.
Therefore, if the submatrix consisting of columns {Lt : τ < t < τ ′} restricted to rows of the form
((v, σ)(∗, ∗)) can be shown to have large rank, then in some sense we may isolate this submatrix
and inductively show a large rank for the rest of the matrix.
Furthermore, if there is some player w which is inactive in the sequence, playing strategy σw
from the start, then the submatrix restricted to ((v, ∗)(w, σw)) rows, and columns indexed by moves
of player v, can again be isolated and shown to be upper-triangular.
These observations can be extended to hold simultaneously for all intervals between two con-
secutive moves of the non-repeating players: Let P1 be the set of non-repeating players, and let
T = {τv : v ∈ P1} be the set of all moves for non-repeating players. Suppose T = {t1 < t2 < . . . <
tm}, and say t0 = 0, tm+1 = |S|. Let Si for i = 0, 1, . . . , m be the subsequence of S between ti
and ti+1 excluding endpoints. We call these Si the separated blocks of the sequence S. If the move
at time ti is (vi, σ
i), then it can be seen that
rank(S) ≥ |T |+∑mi=0 rank∣∣((vi,σi)(∗,∗))(Si)
where rank
∣∣
C
(S) is the rank of the submatrix given by S restricted to entries from C. This is shown
in Lemma A.2 by applying the above observations, and sorting the blocks in increasing order.
Extension via Critical Subsequences. As argued in Lemma A.2, it is not hard to show that
for any sequence S, rank(S) ≥ d(S) − q0(S). In fact, we show that for a separable block Si,
rank
∣∣
((vi,σi)(∗,∗))
(Si) ≥ d(Si)− q0(Si). However, this is not enough to immediately give the desired
rank bound of d(S)− q0(S) + d1(S)/2. For this, we introduce the notion of a critical subsequence,
based on the notion of a critical block introduced in Angel et al. [2017]. Let ℓ(S) denote the length
of a sequence, and call a contiguous subsequence S′ ⊆ S critical if ℓ(S′) ≥ 2(d(S′)− q0(S′)), but for
every sub-subsequence S′′ ( S′, ℓ(S′′) < 2(d(S′′)− q0(S′′)). We show in Claim A.4 that for any S
with |S| ≥ 2nk, S must contain some critical subsequence S′ which satisfies ℓ(S′) = 2(d(S′)−q0(S′)).
Consider, now, the rank bounds due to separated blocks applied to a critical subsequence S′:
since every separated block Si of S
′ is a strict subsequence of S′, d(Si) − q0(Si) > ℓ(Si)/2, but
ℓ(S′) = d1(S
′) +
∑
Si separated
ℓ(Si), so
rank(S′) ≥ d1(S′) +
∑
Si sep.
d(Si)− q0(Si) > d1(S′)/2 + ℓ(S′)/2
Our desired rank bound follows from recalling that ℓ(S′) = 2d(S′)− 2q0(S′).
Union Bound via Bucketing. Working within a critical subsequence allows us to find high-
rank subsequences. However, when the critical subsequence is too small, issues may arise when
taking the union bound over all sequences: there are kn(nk)ℓ sequences of length ℓ, and the rank of
a sequence is at most its length. Thus, we get success probability 1−kn(nk)ℓ(φǫ)ℓ in the best case.
If ℓ is small, the kn term dominates the probability bound, and ǫ may need to be exponentially
small for good results. The issue at hand is that the initial strategies of inactive players contribute
too much to the union bound. For the case of p1 ≥ p2, we separate out their effect on the potential
function, and simply keep track of the effect size. The first part of this method was introduced
in Angel et al. [2017], and allows us to reduce the kn term to a kp(S) term, while paying in the
exponent of ǫ. The idea is as follows: let P0 be the inactive players, and P1 be the active players.
then
payoff(σ) =
∑
uv∈E
Auv(σu, σv) =
∑
u,v∈P1
Auv(σu, σv) +
∑
u∈P1
∑
w∈P0
Auw(σu, σw) +
∑
w,w′∈P0
Aww′(σw, σw′)
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The left terms depend only on the strategies of the active players, the right term is constant, and
the middle terms can be separated into |P1| constant terms, one per active player, per strategy
played. These constant terms may be rounded to the nearest multiple of ǫ, and lie in the range
[−n, n]. Therefore, we need only keep track of kp(S)(2n/ǫ)d(S)(nk)ℓ values. Unfortunately, this is
shy of our goal, as we can only show rank d(S)− q0(S) +Ω(p1), rather than d(S)+Ω(p1). Shifting
the sum to cancel the initial payoff of all players, however, allows us to reduce the union bound:
payoff(σt)− payoff(σ0) =
∑
u,v∈P1
A˜uv(σ
t
u, σ
t
v) +
∑
u∈P1
∑
w∈P0
A˜uw(σ
t
u, σ
t
w) +
∑
w,w′∈P0
A˜ww′(σ
t
w, σ
t
w′)
where A˜uv(σ, σ
′) = Auv(σ, σ
′) − Auv(σ0u, σ0v). This has the effect of cancelling out q0(S) distinct
middle terms, getting the desired union bound.
3.3.2 Mostly Repeating Players, and Cyclical Sums
Recall the table of bounds from Section 3.3. The previous section showed the bounds and analyses
for the first row of the table, in the case p1 ≥ p2. The previous section’s analysis only works when
restricted to a critical subsequence S′ with p1(S
′) ≥ p2(S′). Thus, we must also restrict ourselves to
a critical subsequence, where here p2(S
′) ≥ p1(S′). This means we must again find ways to control
the union bound terms due to inactive players.
The fundamental concept here is the notion of a cyclical sum. These are vectors which are sums
of vectors from L, which all have zero entries in rows for inactive players. Suppose player u moved
to strategy i twice, and let τ0 be the first occurrence of (u, i) in the BR sequence (possibly t=0), and
let τ1, τ2, . . . , τk be all subsequent appearances of u in the sequence, playing any strategy. Suppose
τm is the second occurrence of (u, i) in the BR sequence. Let w be some inactive player, who is
always playing strategy σw. Then the sum Lτ1 + Lτ2 + · · · + Lτm cancels out all ((u, ∗)(w, σw))
entries, since each one gets added in some Lτi , and and removed in Lτi+1 , where τm+1 = τ1. These
sums, therefore, do not depend on the initial configurations of inactive players.
Thus, working with the cyclic sums gives a kp(S)(nk)ℓ-sized union bound. However, the main
lemma of the common framework does not directly apply, since we are bounding the rank of
these cyclic sums instead of L. We use the fact that Pr[〈Lt, A〉 ∈ (0, ǫ) for t = τ1, τ2, . . . ] ≤
Pr[〈Lτ1 + Lτ2 + · · ·+ Lτm , A〉 ∈ (0, ℓǫ)] and bound this instead.
A Rank Bound for Cyclic Sums. It remains to show that these cyclical sums have large rank.
This rank bound will be applicable in the case of non-complete graphs as well as complete. A
cyclical sum must contain a non-zero entry, as otherwise the sequence can not be improving. This
allows us to form an auxiliary digraph, where the nodes are the active players, and we add an edge
from a repeating player u to any other player v, if some cyclic sum for u contains a non-zero entry
with v. We show in Lemma A.7 that there exists a way to bi-partition the nodes of this graph such
that for one of the two halves contains at least half of the repeating players, and each node in this
half has an out-neighbor in the other half. These edges, and their associated matrix entries, allow
us to form an upper-triangular sub-matrix of rank p2/2, giving us the desired bound.
3.4 Smoothed Quasipolynomial Complexity of the BRA on General Graphs
We have shown above that for complete game graphs, the BRA terminates in polynomial time with
high probability, and in expectation. We discuss here how the cyclic-sum interpretation of Sec-
tion 3.3.2 immediately gives quasi-polynomial smoothed complexity for arbitrary game graphs.
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Lemma 3.4 in Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017] proves that any sequence of Ω(n) improving moves
must contain a subsequence S′ with at least Ω(ℓ(S′)/ log n) distinct repeated moves. For k-
NetCoordNash, this implies that a sequence of Ω(nk) player-strategy pairs in a BRA sequence
must contain a subsequence S′ with at least Ω(ℓ(S′)/ log(nk)) distinct recurring pairs. Therefore,
p2 ≥ Ω(ℓ/k log(nk)), since each player can only appear in k distinct pairs. This fact, along with
the discussion in Section 3.3.2, allow us to show the following:
Theorem 3.3. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash with an arbitrary initial strategy
profile, then any execution of a BR algorithm where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will con-
verge to a PNE in at most φ · (nk)O(k log(nk)) steps, with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k).
Our results also include a meta-theorem stating that, for any problem in PLS with bounded total
improvement, a w.h.p. smoothed complexity bound implies an expected-time bound (see Section B,
Theorem B.1). This, together with Theorem 3.2, imply:
Theorem 3.4. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash with an arbitrary initial strategy
profile, then any execution of BRA where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will converge to a
PNE in O(φ) · (nk)O(k log(nk)) steps in expectation. Furthermore, if the game graph is complete, it
converges in at most (nkφ)O(k) steps in expectation.
3.5 Smoothness-Preserving Reduction to 1- and 2-FlipMaxCut
Our second set of results analyzes smoothness-preserving reductions for the k-NetCoordNash prob-
lem, to give alternate algorithms, and to introduce a reduction framework for smoothed problems.
The authors of this paper do not know of any prior notion of smoothness-preserving reduction.
Recall the smoothness-preserving reductions defined in Section 2.2. In this section, we discuss how
these reduction may be applied (Theorem 3.5), and then give an overview of how to obtain such
reductions for the k-NetCoordNash problem and prove Theorems 3.6 and 3.7 below. All the details
and proofs are in Section C.
First, if problem P admits a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to problem Q, and Q has
smoothed polynomial algorithm w.h.p., then so does P. Since such reductions allow use of extra
randomness, we need to ensure that it does not affect the high-probability statement by much. We
do this using Markov’s inequality and careful interpretation of the extra randomness. Second, if
problem P admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut on (in)-complete graphs,
then P has smoothed (quasi)-polynomial complexity. This crucially requires a rank-based analysis
like Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Angel et al. [2017], Bibak et al. [2018] for local-max-cut. These
are formalized in the following result:
Theorem 3.5. Suppose problem Q has (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity. Then, if problem P
admits a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to Q, then P also has (quasi-)polynomial smoothed
complexity. If instead, P admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut on an
(arbitrary) complete graph, then P again has a (quasi)polynomial smoothed complexity.
This allows us to extend smoothed efficient algorithms for one problem to others. Ideally
we would like to show strong reductions. However, we manage to show weak reductions from k-
NetCoordNash to 1- or 2-FlipMaxCut. Note that the smoothed complexity of 2-FlipMaxCut is not
known yet, but we believe that the 2-FLIP algorithm may admit a similar rank-based analysis as
FLIP. This would imply a smoothed efficient algorithm for k-NetCoordNash for non-constant k.
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k-NetCoordNash to 2-FlipMaxCut. We wish to show the following result:
Theorem 3.6. k-NetCoordNash admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to 2-FlipMaxCut.
The idea for the reduction is, given an instance of a Network Coordination Game, construct
a graph whose locally optimal cuts can be mapped to strategy profiles, and cut values can be
interpreted as the total payoff of the network game. To do this, we construct a graph with nk + 2
nodes, including two terminals s and t, and nk nodes indexed by player-strategy pairs (u, i). All
nodes are connected to s and t, any two (u, ∗) nodes are connected, and any two (u, ∗), (v, ∗) nodes
are connected if u and v share an edge in the game graph. Thus, the cut graph is complete if and
only if the game graph is. Call a cut S, T valid if s ∈ S, t ∈ T , and S contains at most one (u, ∗)
for each u. Any such cut naturally maps to a strategy profile as follows: If player u appears in
S paired with strategy i, then set σu = i. Otherwise, set σu = 0, a “dummy” strategy with bad
payoff. Call this profile σ(S). We select edge weights such that all local-max cuts are valid, by
ensuring that any non-valid cut can always be improved by removing any redundant node. We also
get that for any valid cut S, the total cut value is equal to payoff(σ(S)). Furthermore, updating
a player’s strategy in a valid cut amounts to removing one (u, i) vertex from S, and adding some
(u, i′). Therefore, a unilateral deviation is equivalent to a 2-FLIP step.
Since any deviation amounts to one step of 2-FLIP, it follows that σ(S) is a PNE if and only
if S is a local-max-cut up to 2 flips. We also show that edge-weights are linearly independent
combinations of the random inputs, and that if the network coordination game instance satisfies
the smoothed-inputs condition, then the edge weights do too, proving Theorem 3.6.
2-NetCoordNash to 1-FlipMaxCut. Here, we take a slightly different reduction, where there
are n+2 nodes in the graph, and any s-t cut is interpreted as follows: if u is on the same side as s
of the cut, σu = 1, otherwise, σu = 2. The same analysis goes through, but now, locally max cuts
up to one flip are Nash Equilibria, which provides a weak smoothness-preserving reduction from
2-NetCoordNash to 1-FlipMaxCut, showing the following result:
Theorem 3.7. 2-NetCoordNash admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to 1-FlipMaxCut.
The FLIP algorithm for 1-FlipMaxCut has smoothed quasi-polynomial running time in gen-
eral Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], and smoothed polynomial running time if G is a complete graph
Angel et al. [2017]. A recent result Bibak et al. [2018] has improved the running time of the lat-
ter, so this reduction allows us to provide better bounds on the performance of BRA in the case
k = 2. These local-max-cut results, together with Theorems 3.5 and 3.7, give an alternate smoothed
efficient algorithm for the 2-NetCoordNash problem.
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A Smoothed Analysis of the BR Algorithm
In this section we formally show that the better-response (BR) algorithm finds a pure NE of a
k-strategy network-coordination game efficiently under the standard smoothness model (defined in
Section 2.2). We show efficiency both with-high-probability (w.h.p.) and in expectation. We begin
by restating the definition of the problem:
Smoothed k-NetCoordNash Problem. Given a k-strategy network-coordination game, de-
fined by an undirected graph G = (V,E) and an (|E|k2)-dimensional payoff vector A, where each
coordinate of A is an independent random variable supported on range [−1, 1] with density at
most φ, find a pure NE (PNE) of the game as defined in Section 2.1.
Since the real-valued input to the k-NetCoordNash problem is stochastic, the running time of
any algorithm will be stochastic, and the efficiency guarantees will be w.h.p. or in expectation. We
define below our notation for the better-response algorithm (BRA) and its properties.
Definition A.1. A better-response (BR) sequence is denoted as a sequence of (player, strategy)
pairs S = (u1, i1), (u2, i2), . . .. We interpret S as a sequence of player moves, where on the t
th move,
player ut changes their strategy to play strategy it. It is assumed that they were not already playing
it.
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Notation. Throughout a BR sequence, the strategy profile of the players is changing. We recall
the σ notation introduced in Section 3.2: denote as σ0 ∈ {1, . . . , k}n the initial strategy profile
before the sequence S, and let σt be the profile after the tth move. Hence, σt differs from σt−1
only in the entry for σut , and σ
t
ut = it.
To better analyze better-response sequences, we must define some parameters as follows:
Definition A.2 (Active, Inactive, Repeating, and Non-Repeating players.). Let S be a BR se-
quence, then player u is said to be active if it appears in the sequence, and otherwise, it is termed
inactive. An active player u is said to be repeating if there exists some strategy i such that (u, i)
appears at least twice in S, or if (u, σ0i ) appears in S at all. An active player which is not repeating
is said to be non-repeating.
Notation. We denote as p(S) the total number of active players in the BR sequence S, p1(S)
as the number of non-repeating players, and p2(S) as the number of repeating players. When
the sequence in question is clear from context, we omit the S and use p, p1 and p2, respectively.
Furthermore, let d(S) denote the number of distinct (player,strategy) moves of S, and let q0(S)
denote the number of (u,σ0u) moves in S, that is, moves where players return to the original strategy
from the start of the sequence.
Our proof follows the common framework outlined in Section 3.1. The following lemma is the
key probability bound from this framework.
Lemma A.1 (Ro¨glin [2008]). Let X ∈ Rd be a vector of d independent random variables where
each Xi has density bounded by φ. Let α1, . . . , αr be r linearly independent vectors in Z
d. then the
joint density of (〈αi,X〉)i∈[r] is bounded by φr, and for any given b1, b2, . . . ∈ R and ǫ > 0,
Pr
[∧r
i=1 〈αi,X〉 ∈ [bi, bi + ǫ]
]
≤ (φǫ)r
As outlined in Section 3.1, the goal is to model the improvement in potential at each step by
some linear combination of the random payoff values, and show that it is unlikely that every step
has improvement in (0, ǫ). If some step has improvement either larger than ǫ, or less than 0, then
the sequence is either not an improving sequence, or has good improvement. To this end, we define
the notion of a transformation set below. Not only do we want large improvement for any improving
sequence, we also want this to hold simultaneously for all (by taking a union bound): if every BR
sequence of length 2nk, for arbitrary starting configuration of players, is either not improving, or
has a step of size greater than ǫ, then the BRA must terminate in at most 2nk · n2/ǫ steps, since
the potential function lies between −(n2) and (n2). We seek to show sufficiently good probability
bounds such that this holds for ǫ = 1/(nkφ)O(k) for complete game graphs, and 1/(nkφ)O(k log(nk))
for general game graphs. Thus, we would have that the BRA terminates in at most (nkφ)O(k) steps
for complete graphs, and (nkφ)O(k log(nk)) in general. We formalize this as follows:
Definition A.3 (Minimum Improvement). For a fixed sequence of moves, say S, the change in
potential as time progresses is a random variable, since the values being added and subtracted (the
A payoff values) are random. Therefore, any sequence of moves S has some probability of being a
BR sequence, i.e. a sequence of moves every one of which is an increase in the potential. We define
the random variable ∆N , which captures the total increase in potential of the worst BR sequence
of length exactly N moves. Therefore, for any fixed sequence of moves S of length N , and any
arbitrary initial profile σ0, either S is not a BR sequence under random payoffs A, or performing
S increases the potential function by at least ∆N .
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As described above, we wish to show that for N = 2nk, the probability that ∆N ≤ 1/(nkφ)O(k)
is vanishingly small if the game graph is complete, and the probability that ∆N ≤ 1/(nkφ)O(k log(nk))
is vanishingly small in general, which allows us to bound the total duration of a BR sequence.
Definition A.4 (Transformation Set). For any fixed BR sequence of length ℓ, we define the set of
vectors L = {L1, L2, . . . , Lℓ}, where Lt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}(|E|×k2),∀t. The entries of Lt are indexed by
indices of payoff matrices, denoted ((u, i)(v, j)). The values of its entries are chosen as follows:
Lt((u, i)(v, j)) =

1 if: ut ∈ {u, v} and σtu = i and σtv = j.
−1 if: ut ∈ {u, v} and σt−1u = i and σt−1v = j.
0 otherwise.
That is, every entry signifies if the corresponding payoff value remains unchanged (0), or gets added
(+1) or removed (−1) from the potential function. We denote this set as the transformation set of
a sequence, and each vector Li as the transformation vector of the corresponding move.
The inner product 〈Lt, A〉 gives the change in the total payoff of the player who makes a move
at time t, hence also gives the change in the sum of payoffs due to the tth move of the entire game.
The rest of the analysis is dedicated to ensuring that the transformation set has large rank, large
enough to counter a union bound over all sequences.
A.1 Smoothed Polynomial Complexity for Complete Game Graphs
Our analysis begins with the case where the game graph is complete. The completeness of the game
graph will allow us to single out a vertex, and use edges to that vertex to show large rank. We
wish to show that the BRA algorithm will terminate in poly(nk, k, φ) steps with high probability.
We begin by handling a simple case:
Informal Lemma. Suppose we could guarantee that every 2nk-length sequence had all players
active, then any execution of BRA must terminate in (nkφ)O(k) steps with probability 1−1/(nk)O(1).
Proof. From Corollary A.3, which we will show below, if S has all n players active, then the
transformation set L of S has rank at least
(
1− 1n
)(
d(S)−q0(S)
) ≥ n−1. Thus, any such sequence
S is either ǫ-improving (has improvement at least ǫ) or non-improving (non-positive improvement)
with probability 1 − (φǫ)n−1. However, we want this to hold for every sequence. For any fixed
ℓ, there are (nk)ℓ BR sequences of length ℓ, and kn possible initial configurations. Thus, the
probability that every sequence of length 2nk is neither non-improving nor ǫ-improving, for any
initial configuration, is at most kn(nk)2nk(φǫ)n−1. For this value to be vanishingly small, i.e.
1/(nk)O(1), it suffices to set ǫ = 1/φ(nk)O(k). As discussed above, this implies that with probability
1− 1/poly(n, k), the BRA will terminate in time 2n3k/ǫ = (nkφ)O(k).
The above lemma, however, relies on a condition which cannot be guaranteed: not every suf-
ficiently long sequence has n active players. In what follows, we lower bound the rank of the
transformation set for sufficiently long BR sequences, and pair them with nontrivial union bounds,
to get our desired results.
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A.1.1 Case I: Mostly Non-Repeating Players
We will be showing rank bounds which depend on the p1 and p2 parameters defined above. Splitting
this analysis into the cases p1 ≥ p2 and p2 ≥ p1 allows us to combine these and get bounds in terms
of p. We consider first the case p1 ≥ p2, and the following definition:
Definition A.5 (Separated Blocks). Let P1(S) be the set of non-repeating players in a BR se-
quence, and for any u ∈ P1, let Tu be the set of indices where the moving player is u. Let
T =
⋃
u∈P1
Tu, the set of indices of all non-repeating-player moves, and suppose T = {t1 < t2 <
· · · < tm} We will show below how the ti’s “separate” the sequence S. To this end, let Si for
i = 0, 1, . . . , m be the subsequences of S from time ti to ti+1 excluding boundaries, respectively,
where t0 = 0 and tm+1 = |S|. Then these Si’s are the separated blocks of S. Denote their collection
as S = {S0, S1, . . . , Sm}. Furthermore, denote |T | as d1(S).
The following lemma allows us to take advantage of this notion of separated block, to break up
the rank bounds into simpler subproblems.
Lemma A.2. Let S be a BR sequence with at least one inactive player, and let L = {L1, L2, . . . }
be its transformation set. Then L contains at least d1(S)+
∑
S′∈S d(S
′)−q0(S′) linearly independent
vectors, where S is the collection of separated blocks of S.
Proof. Let w be some inactive player, which we have assumed exists. Let T = {t1 < t2 < · · · < tm}
be the endpoints of the separated blocks, as in Definition A.5 above. For i = 0, 1, . . . , m, let Di
be the set of distinct (player,strategy) moves which occur in Si, which are not return moves of Si,
i.e. (u,σtiu ) moves.
For all i, the move at ti must be some non-repeating player of S, which we denote vi, and call
the strategy it moves to as σi. (Take v0 = w, σ
0 = σ0w). For all (u, σ) ∈ Di, let τ i(u,σ) be the
time of the first occurrence of (u, σ) in the subsequence Si, and let Hi = {τ i(u,σ) : (u, σ) ∈ Di}.
Let H =
⋃|S|−1
i=0 Hi ∪ {t1, . . . , t|S|−1}. For each t ∈ H, if t = τ i(u,σ) ∈ Hi for some i, u, σ, then
associate to Lt the row ((u, σ)(vi, σ
i)). If, instead, t = ti for some i, then associate to Lt the row
((vi, σ
i)(w, σ0)).
Consider the submatrix of L consisting of all columns {Lt : t ∈ H}, sorted in “chronological”
order, and all of their associated rows, in the same order as their respectively associated columns.
We claim that this matrix is upper-triangular, and its diagonal entries are non-zero. For each
column Lt, the diagonal entry in the submatrix is the entry for the associated row, which we have
chosen to be nonzero. Furthermore, if t = ti ∈ H, then vi no ((vi, σi)(∗, ∗)) entry can have been
non-zero, since vi is non-repeating. Thus, Lti is the first column where the associated row has
a nonzero entry. If, instead, t = τ i(u,σ) ∈ Hi, then the associated row ((u, σ)(vi, σi)) must have
been 0 up until column Lti as described above. Furthermore, since τ
i
(u,σ) is the first occurrence of
(u, σ 6= σtiu ) after time ti, we must have had the row ((u, σ)(vi, σi)) be 0 before the τ i(u,σ)-th column.
These observations imply that our |H| × |H| submatrix, with the given row-ordering, must
be upper-triangular with nonzero diagonal terms. Therefore, it must be full-rank. Since |Hi| =
d(Si)− q0(Si), then |H| = d1(S) +
∑
S′∈S d(S
′)− q0(S′), and we conclude the desired bound.
Corollary A.3. Let S be a BR sequence where all players are active, and let L = {L1, L2, . . . } be
its transformation set. Then L contains at least
(
1− 1n
)
(d(S)−q0(S)) linearly independent vectors.
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Proof. Consider the above proof method with |T | = 0, and S0 = S. Note that now, H = D0. It
is still correct if some arbitrary player is chosen to be the w player, and all ((u, σ)(v0, σ
0)) terms
are replaced with ((u, σ)(w,σ
τ0
(u,σ) )) terms. We must further restrict H not to contain any moves
of player w.
Suppose we choose, as our w player, the player which appears the least number of times in H,
then we suffer a
(
1
n
)
-fraction loss in the size of H, concluding the proof.
Now, the rank bound of Lemma A.2 is not in a very usable form, as it requires too much
structural information about the sequence S to use. To this end, we turn to the definition of
critical subsequence, closely based on the definition of a critical block in Angel et al. [2017].
Definition A.6 (Critical Subsequence). For every contiguous subsequence B of S, let ℓ(B), d(B),
and q0(B) be length, number of distinct pairs, and number of return moves, in B, respectively.
Such a subsequence is termed critical if ℓ(B) ≥ 2(d(B) − q0(B)), but for every B′ ⊆ B, ℓ(B′) <
2
(
d(B′)− q0(B′)
)
.
Note that a return move for a subsequence B which starts at time tB is a move (u,σ
tB
u ), as
opposed to a (u,σ0u) move. We show here that critical subsequences always exist.
Claim A.4. A critical subsequence always exists in any sequence S of length 2nk. Furthermore, if
B is a critical subsequence, then ℓ(B) = 2(d(B)− q0(B)).
Proof. As there are at most nk distinct player-strategy pairs possible, the entire sequence S satisfies
the relation ℓ(S) ≥ 2d(S) ≥ 2(d(S) − q0(S)). Conversely, for every subsequence B of length 1 (i.e.
a single move), d(B) = 1, q0(B) = 0 ⇒ 1 = ℓ(B) < 2(d(B) − q0(B)) = 2. Thus, it suffices to
take an inclusion-minimal subsequence which satisfies ℓ(B) ≥ 2(d(B)− q0(B)) and obtain a critical
subsequence.
It remains to show that for B critical ℓ(B) = 2d(B) − 2q0(B). Suppose not, then it is strictly
larger. Let B′ be obtained from B by dropping the last column. Then,
ℓ(B′) = ℓ(B)− 1 ≥ 2d(B) − 2q0(B) + 1− 1
Now, we claim d(B)− q0(B) ≥ d(B′)− q0(B′). Clearly d(B)− 1 ≤ d(B′) ≤ d(B), and q0(B)− 1 ≤
q0(B
′) ≤ q0(B). However, if q0(B′) = q0(B)− 1, then we must also have d(B′) = d(B)− 1. Thus,
in all cases, d(B) − q0(B) ≥ d(B′)− q0(B′). This implies ℓ(B′) ≥ 2(d(B′)− q0(B′)), contradicting
the criticality of B.
The tight bound ℓ(B) = 2d(B)−q0(B) is the final key in proving the main rank lemma from this
section, below. Since we prove that any critical subsequence has good rank, and any sequence has
a critical subsequence, then this shows that any length-2nk sequence has a high-rank subsequence.
Lemma A.5. Let S be a BR sequence of length 2nk which has at least one inactive player. Let
B be some critical subsequence of S and let L be B’s transformation set. Then L contains at least
1
2d1(B) + d(B)− q0(B) linearly independent vectors.
Proof. Since S has an inactive player, then so must B. Therefore, Lemma A.2 applies. Recall,
Lemma A.2 shows that L contains at least d1(B) +
∑
S′∈S(B) d(S
′) − q0(S′) linearly independent
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vectors. If p1(B) = d1(B) = 0, then we are done. Otherwise, since B is critical, then for all
S′ ∈ S(B), ℓ(S′) < 2(d(S′)− q0(S′)). Hence,
rank(L) ≥ d1(B) +
∑
S′∈S(B)
d(S′)− q0(S′) > 12d1(B) + 12d1(B) +
∑
S′∈S(B)
1
2ℓ(S
′)
However, ℓ(B) = d1(B) +
∑
S′∈S(B) ℓ(S
′), and so this implies rank(L) ≥ 12d1(B) + 12ℓ(B). By
criticality and Claim A.4, ℓ(B) ≥ 2(d(B)− q0(B)), giving us our desired bound.
Since we have bounded the total increase on critical subsequences, though, rather than long
sequences, we introduce the following notation:
Definition A.7. Recall the notation ∆(ℓ) from Definition A.8. We similarly define ∆′(p) as the
minimum total increase due to any critical subsequence with exactly p active players, where the
initial strategy profile is arbitrary. We also denote as ∆(p) the minimum total increase taken over
critical subsequences where p1 ≥ p2, and ∆(p), the converse. Thus, ∆′(p) = min{∆(p), ∆(p)}.
Our first main result is to show that the probability of ∆(p) being small is vanishing. It does not
suffice, however, to follow the same structure as the “informal lemma” above: critical subsequences
may be very short, and for any sequence S, its rank can not be more than ℓ(S). A probability bound
of the form kn(nk)ℓ(φǫ)ℓ will require ǫ far too small if ℓ≪ n, since the kn term will dominate. The
following proof technique illustrates that no kn term is needed in a union bound when p is small.
Theorem A.6. Pr
[
∆(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ ((20φ2n3k3)k ǫ1/4)p .
Proof. We have shown in Lemma A.5 that a critical subsequence has high rank. However, as
discussed above, this does not suffice to counteract simple union bounds. Recall the potential
function payoff(σ) from (1), which represents the sum of the payoffs on all game edges at strategy
σ. For simplicity of notation, let H(t) denote payoff(σt). Note that analyzing the change in H(t)
through any BR sequence is unaffected by shifting H by a constant. We will the initial payoff as
this constant: let H ′(t) := H(t)−H(0).
Our goal is to bound the rate of change of H ′(t) over all possible BR sequence which form
critical subsequences. Let P be the set of all active players, and Q, the set of inactive players. Note
that
H ′(t) =
n−1∑
u=1
n∑
v=u+1
A((u,σtu)(v,σ
t
v))−A((u,σ0u)(v,σ0v))
For simplicity of notation, denote A˜((u, σu)(v, σv)) = A((u, σu)(v, σv))−A((u,σ0u)(v,σ0v)). Then
H ′(t) :=
∑
u,v∈P
A˜((u,σtu)(v,σ
t
v)) +
∑
w,w′∈Q
A˜((w,σtw)(w
′,σtw′)) +
∑
u∈P
∑
w∈Q
A˜((u,σtu)(w,σ
t
w))
Now, for w ∈ Q, σtw = σ0w, so the second term is 0. Furthermore, the inner-sum of the 3rd terms
are in fact constants which depend on the strategy of the active player. Thus, define C(u, σ) :=∑
w∈Q A˜((u, σ)(w,σ
0
w)). Then the above sum can be expressed as
H ′(t) :=
∑
u,v∈P
A˜((u,σtu)(v,σ
t
v)) + 0 +
∑
u∈P
C(u,σtu)
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Also, note that C(u,σ0u) = 0, since the A˜ terms cancel. This reduction to C terms is the key to
our analysis: To bound ∆, we must bound H ′(t)−H ′(t− 1) for all t ≥ 1, and these values, in turn,
depend only on the vector A, the initial strategies of the active players, the improving sequence, and
the C(u, σ) values for each of the pairs (u, σ) which appear in the sequence. As noted, C(u,σ0u) = 0
for all u, so we need not consider them for initial strategies.
We can not, however, enumerate all the possible C values in our union bound. Note, however,
that approximating the C values simply approximated the H values. Thus, we may round the C
values to the nearest multiple of ǫ, as was first introduced in Angel et al. [2017]. Let C ′(u, σ) be
the nearest multiple of ǫ to C(u, σ). Since C(u, σ) ∈ [−n, n] for all u and σ, then there are 2n/ǫ
possible choices for C ′(u, σ). Furthermore, for any time t, note that H(t)−H(t− 1) depends only
on two C terms, namely C(u,σtu) and C(u,σ
t−1
u ). Thus, replacing these with C
′ terms modifies
the value of H(t)−H ′(t) by at most 2ǫ/2, and so the event H ′(t)−H ′(t− 1) ∈ (0, ǫ) is less likely
than H˜ ′(t) − H˜ ′(t − 1) ∈ (−ǫ, 2ǫ), where H˜ ′ is simply the approximation due to replacing C with
C ′.
It remains, then, to apply Lemma A.1: for any one critical subsequence S on p players, if p1 ≥ p2,
then by Lemma A.5, the improvement of each step of the approximate potential along the sequence
will lie in (−ǫ, 2ǫ) with probability (3φǫ)d(S)−q0(S)+p(S)/4. Taking a union bound over all approxi-
mated sequences, this event holds with probability kp(S)(nk)ℓ(S)(2n/ǫ)d(S)−q0(S)(3φǫ)d(S)−q0(S)+p(S)/4,
since there are only d(S)− q0(S) C values to approximate, and the rest of the value depends only
on the initial configurations of the active players. Thus, noting that d(S) − q0(S) ≤ k · p(S), and
since S is critical, ℓ(S) ≤ 2d(S)− 2q0(S) ≤ 2kp(S), we have
Pr
[
∆ ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ kp(S)(nk)ℓ(S)(2n/ǫ)d(S)−q0(S)(3φǫ)d(S)−q0(S)+p(S)/4
≤ 20k·p(S)(nkφ)2k·p(S)(nk)k·p(S)ǫp(S)/4
=
(
(20n3k3φ2)kǫ1/4
)p(S)
as desired.
A.1.2 Case II: Mostly Repeating Players
We have shown in the previous section how to bound the probability of ∆ being small. In this
case, we handle ∆, that is, the minimum improvement of critical subsequences when p2 ≥ p1. The
proof method in this case is very different from the converse case, but as above, we must still use
work around the kn term in the standard union bound. This is done, in this case, by combining
the columns of L into vectors which have zero entries for all payoff values with inactive players,
and bounding their rank instead.
Lemma A.7. Let S be a BR sequence, and let L = {L1, L2, . . . } be its transformation set. Then
the span of L contains at least p2(S)/2 linearly independent vectors V1, . . . , Vp2/2, such that for
all j,
(i) the vector Vj is a 0-1 combination of the Li’s, and
(ii) the value 〈Vj , A〉 does not depend on the strategies of the inactive players.
Proof. Fix a repeating player u, and denote one of its repeating strategies as σ. Let t0 be the
index of the first occurrence of (u, σ) in S, setting t0 = 0 if i = σ
0
u. Let t0 < t1 < t2 < · · · be all
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occurrences of player u in the sequence S starting with t0, and suppose tσ is the index of the second
occurrence of (u, σ). Formally, if S = (u1, i1), (u2, i2), · · · , then utj = u for all j, it0 = its = σ,
and itj 6= σ for all 0 < j < s. Consider, then, the vector V (u) =
∑s
j=1 Ltj . Vector V (u) satisfies
condition (i) by construction. We will show that it satisfies (ii), and that at least p2/2 of them
must be linearly independent.
Let w be any inactive player. For simplicity of notation, denote the strategy itj as ij . Consider
the inner product 〈V (u), A〉 when restricted to the rows indexed by ((u, ∗)(w, ∗)):
〈V (u), A〉∣∣((u,∗)(w,∗)) = s∑
j=1
A((u, ij)(w,σ
0
w))−A((u, ij−1)(w,σ0w))
= A((u, is)(w,σ
0
w))−A((u, i0)(w,σ0w))
= 0
Therefore, the inner product 〈V (u), A〉 is independent of the value of σ0w. Since this holds for all
inactive w, we have proved part (ii).
Now, it suffices to argue that some collection of p2/2 many V vectors are linearly independent.
We begin by constructing an auxiliary directed graph G′ = (V,E′), where V is the set of players,
and E′ will be defined as follows: let u be some repeating player, and define V (u) as above, for the
repeat move (u, σ). The V (u) vector can not be entirely 0, as this would imply that σts and σt0
are the same, and so the sequence could not have been strictly improving. Then, for every player
w such that V (u) for (u, σ) has a non-zero ((u, σ)(w, ∗)) entry, add the edge (u,w) to E′.
Consider the following procedure: pick an arbitrary vertex r1 ∈ P2, and let T1 be the BFS
arborescence rooted at r1 which spans all nodes reachable from r1. Then delete V (T1) from G
′ and
repeat, picking an arbitrary root vertex r2 ∈ P2 \V (T1), and get the arborescence T2 on everything
reachable from r2. We may continue this until every vertex of P2 is covered by some arborescence.
For each i = 1, 2, . . . , let T 0i and T
1
i be the set of nodes of Ti which are of even or odd distance from
r along Ti, respectively. Let P
′
i be the larger of V (T
0
i ) ∩ P2 and V (T 1i ) ∩ P2, and P ′2 :=
⋃∞
i=1 P
′
i .
We must have that |P ′2| ≥ |P2|/2 = p2/2. We wish to show that the collection V := {V (u) :
u ∈ P ′2} is independent. Every u ∈ P ′2 must have some out-neighbour w. If u was not a leaf of the
arborescence it was selected in, then it must have some out-neighbour along the arborescence, and
we may choose this neighbour. This out-neighbour can not also be in P ′2. In this case, V (u) will be
the only vector from V to contain a non-zero ((u, ∗)(w, ∗)) entry, since w was not taken in P ′2. If,
instead, u was a leaf of its arborescence, then its out-neighbours must be in previously constructed
arborescences. Let w be any such neigbour, then V (w) can not contain a non-zero ((u, ∗)(w, ∗))
entry, as otherwise u would have been in the other arborescence. Therefore, V (u) is the only vector
in V to contain a nonzero ((u, ∗)(w, ∗)) entry. Thus, V must contain a |V|× |V| diagonal submatrix,
and therefore has rank at least |V| ≥ p2/2, as desired.
Therefore, we have shown that the transformation set of any sequence must have large rank
if p2 ≥ p1. However, the vectors of the transformation set depend on the strategies of inactive
players, whereas these V vectors do not. We will show that this issue can be circumvented, and
prove our second main result. Recall that ∆(p) is the (random) minimum improvement of any
critical subsequence S with p players and p2(S) ≥ p1(S).
Theorem A.8. Pr
[
∆(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ (2(nk)2kk5/4(nφǫ)1/4)p.
Proof. Let L be the transformation set of some critical subsequence S, and V be a collection of
p2(S)/2 independent V vectors from Lemma A.7 applied to S. If V ∈ V is given by V =
∑m
i=1 Lti
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for some collection of indices ti, then we have that Pr[
∧m
i=1 〈Lti , A〉 ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ Pr[〈V,A〉 ∈ (0,mǫ)].
Since m ≤ ℓ, then taking the collection of all V vectors and applying Lemma A.1, we have
Pr
[∧ℓ(S)
t=1 〈Lt, A〉 ∈ (0, ǫ)
]
≤ Pr [∧V ∈V 〈V,A〉 ∈ (0, ℓǫ)] ≤ (ℓφǫ)p2(S)/2
Note that to construct the V vectors, it suffices to have the initial strategies of the active players,
and the BR sequence. Thus, there are at most kp(S)(nk)ℓ(S) possible collections V. Since we are
restricting ourselves to critical subsequences, we have ℓ(S) = 2(d(S)− q0(S)) ≤ k · p(S). Therefore,
we have
Pr
[
∆(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ kp(S)(nk)ℓ(S)(ℓφǫ)p2(S)/2
≤ n2k·p(S)k(2k+1)p(S)(2kp)p(S)/4(φǫ)p(S)/4
≤
(
2(nk)2kk5/4(nφǫ)1/4
)p(S)
as desired.
A.1.3 Combining Both Cases
We have shown above that ∆(p) and ∆(p) have vanishing probability of lying in (0, ǫ). In this
section, we use these results to show that the BRA will terminate in time polynomial in nk, k and
φ, with high probability, when the game graph is complete. The following lemma combines our two
previous results:
Lemma A.9. Given an improving sequence of length 2nk, the minimum improvement after per-
forming all moves in the sequence is at least ǫ = (nkφ)−O(k) with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k).
Proof. We will perform a case analysis based on the values of p1(S) and p2(S), with cases for
p(S) = n, p(S) < n and p1(S) ≥ p2(S), and p2(S) ≥ p1(S).
If p(S) = n, we apply the rank bound of Corollary A.3 and take a union bound over all initial
strategy profiles, and all possible sequences to get
Pr[∆′(n) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ kn(nk)2nk(φǫ)n−1
≤
(
k3kn2kφǫ
)n/
φǫ
This union bound over-counts the number of sequences with p(S) = n, but this isn’t a problem.
Setting ǫ = φ−1
(
n2k3
)−2k
gives, for n sufficiently large, Pr[∆′(n) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ ( 1
n2k3
)n
.
In the converse case, we combine Theorems A.6 and A.8, then take a union bound over all
possible values of p to bound the probability for any sequence of the given length. As defined
previously, ∆′(p) = min{∆(p), ∆(p)} and so,
Pr[∆′(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
(
(20φ2n3k3)kǫ1/4
)p
+
(
2(φǫ)1/4n2k+1/4k2k+5/4
)p
≤ 2
(
(20φ2n3k3)kǫ1/4
)p
(3)
Since any sequence of length 2nk must contain a critical subsequence, it suffices to set ǫ =(
20φ2n3k3
)−4k−4
, and taking the union bound over all choices of p, we get
Pr[∆′ ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
n∑
p=1
(
20φ2n3k4
)−p ≤ 1
(20φ2n3k4)− 1
Combining the two cases of p = n and p < n gives us our desired result.
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It remains to conclude that any execution of the BRA will find a PNE in polynomial time with
high probability.
Theorem A.10. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash on a complete game graph, and
with an arbitrary initial strategy profile, then any execution of BRA where improvements are chosen
arbitrarily will converge to a PNE in at most (nkφ)O(k) steps, with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k, φ).
Proof. Lemma A.9 directly implies the theorem. As outlined in the “common framework” (Sec-
tion 3.1), we begin by partitioning the BRA sequence into blocks of length 2nk. Each such block
must contain a critical subsequences, and therefore with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k, φ) every block
in the partition increases the potential by at least ǫ = (nkφ)−O(k) Since the total improvement is
at most 2n2, since there are only
(
n
2
)
games, this implies that the BR algorithm can only make
at most 2n2(nkφ)O(k) moves. Since making one move takes time polynomial in n and k, we are
done.
A.2 Smoothed Quasi-polynomial Complexity for Arbitrary Graphs
In this section we show the quasi-polynomial running time when the game graph G is incomplete,
and thus prove Theorem 3.3. The analysis mostly uses the lemmas from Section A.1.2, paired with
the following definition and lemma, from Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017]:
Definition A.8. Recall the random variable ∆ from Definition A.3. Call a sequence of length ℓ
log-repeating if it contains at least ℓ/(5 log(nk)) repeating moves (pairs). We denote as ∆(ℓ) the
minimum total potential-improvement after any log-repeating BR sequence of length exactly ℓ.
Lemma A.11 (From Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Lemma 3.4). Let ∆N and ∆(ℓ) be as above.
Then ∆5nk := min1≤ℓ≤5nk∆(ℓ)
The proof of the above lemma proves that any sequence on 5nk pairs must contain some
contiguous sub-sequence which is log-repeating. Thus, for the remainder of the analysis, it suffices
to bound ∆(ℓ). Since a sequence captured by ∆(ℓ) must have at least ℓ/(5 log(nk)) repeated terms,
it must have p2 ≥ ℓ/(5k log(nk)). Therefore, as we have shown in the proof of Theorem A.8, we
have Pr[∆(ℓ) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ kℓ(nk)ℓ(ℓφǫ)ℓ/10k log(nk). It suffices, then to simply take the union bound
over all possible values of ℓ.
Theorem A.12. Given a smoothed instance of k-NetCoordNash with an arbitrary initial strat-
egy profile, then any execution of a BR algorithm where improvements are chosen arbitrarily will
converge to a PNE in at most φ · (nk)O(k log(nk)) steps, with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k).
Proof. As discussed above,
Pr[∆(ℓ) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ kℓ(nk)ℓ(ℓφǫ)ℓ/10k log(nk)
≤
(
k2n(5nkφǫ)1/(10k log(nk))
)ℓ
(ℓ ≤ 5nk)
≤
(
2k3n2(φǫ)1/(10k log(nk))
)ℓ
. (51/10 ≤ 2) (4)
Setting ǫ = φ−1(2n2k3)−2·10k log(nk), this gives
Pr[∆(ℓ) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
(
1
2n2k3
)ℓ
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Let ∆5nk be the improvement in potential in any length 5nk BR sequence. Then using Lemma
A.11, and taking the union bound over all choices of ℓ, we have,
Pr[∆5nk ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
5nk∑
ℓ=1
Pr[∆(ℓ) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
5nk∑
ℓ=1
(2n2k3)−ℓ ≤ (2n
2k3)−1
1− (2n2k3)−1 =
1
2n2k3 − 1
Hence, with probability 1 − 1/poly(n, k) (over the draw of payoff vector A), all BR sequences
of length 5nk will have total improvement at least ǫ. In that case, any execution of BR algorithm
makes an improvement of at least ǫ every 5nk moves. Since the total improvement is at most 2n2,
we conclude that the total number of steps is at most 5nk · 2n2/ǫ = 10n3k(2n2k3)20k log(nk) · φ =
φ · (nk)O(k log(nk)), and this occurs with probability 1− 1/poly(n, k).
This completes our analysis of the smoothed performance of BRA for finding pure Nash equi-
libria in network coordination games. In the next section, we show that this result indeed holds in
expectation, and then go on to show a notion of smoothness-preserving reduction which allows us
to prove alternative, conditional, algorithms for this problem.
B Expected Smoothed Time Complexity
The analysis in the previous section establishes smoothed complexity of network-coordination games
with respect to the with high probability notion. Another aspect of smoothed analysis is to analyze
the expected time of completion of the algorithm. In this section, we provide a theorem to obtain
expected time results from the with high probability bounds. The results are presented in a general
form to allow application to any problem in PLS that has a bounded total improvement in potential
value.
Theorem B.1. Given a PLS problem with input size N , potential function range [−N r1 , N r2 ],
and a local-search algorithm A to solve it, let d be the number of distinct choices the algorithm
has in each step and let Λ be the total size of the search space of the algorithm. For an instance
I drawn at random with maximum density φ, suppose the probability that any length-Nβ sequence
of improving moves of A results in total improvement in the potential value at most ǫ, is at most∑Nβ
q=1((φN)
f(N)(φǫ)1/g(N))q. Then the expected running-time of the algorithm is O(Nβ+r · g(N) ·
(φN)f(N)g(N) · ln Λ). Here, f(N) and g(N) are functions of N .
Proof. The proof is from Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017]. As we have stated it in a more general form,
the analysis is included for completeness.
The maximum improvement possible before A terminates is the maximum change in the po-
tential function value, given by N r2 + N r1 . For any integer t ≥ 1, if the algorithm requires more
than t steps to terminate, then there must exist some subsequence of length Nβ that results in an
improvement in the potential value of less than Nβ(N r2 +N r1)/t ≤ 2Nβ+max{r2,r1}/t. We denote
r := max{r1, r2}.
We define a random variable T as the number of steps A requires to terminate. Using the no-
tation ∆(Nβ) to denote the minimum total improvement in a length-Nβ sequence of the algorithm
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A, this gives the probability of A running for more than t steps as:
Pr[T ≥ t] ≤ Pr[∆(Nβ) ∈ (0, N r+β/t)] ≤
Nβ∑
q=1
(
(φN)f(N)
(
φ · N
β+r
t
)1/g(N))q
.
We define t = γi, for γ = (φN)f(N)g(N)(φN r+β) = φf(N)g(N)+1Nf(N)g(N)+β+r , and compute the
probability of T ≥ γi for any integer i:
Pr[T ≥ γi] ≤
Nβ∑
q=1
(
(φN)f(N)
(
φ · N
r+β
γi
)1/g(N))q
≤
∞∑
q=1
(
1
i
)q/g(N)
≤ g(N)
∞∑
q′=1
(
1
i
)q′
≤ g(N)
i− 1 .
We now sum over all values of t, by using that Pr[T ≥ t] ≤ Pr[T ≥ t · ⌈t/γ⌉], and compute the
expected time steps as:
E[T ] =
Λ∑
t=1
Pr[T ≥ t] ≤
Λ/γ∑
i=1
γ∑
t=1
Pr[T ≥ (i+ 1)γ] ≤
Λ/γ∑
i=2
g(N)γ
i− 1 = O(g(N) · γ · ln Λ)
Thus, replacing the value for γ, the expected runtime is at most O(Nβ+rg(N)(φN)f(N)g(N) ln Λ).
Corollary B.2. The smoothed expected time for BR to terminate for all network-coordination
games is polynomial in (n(k log(nk)), φ).
Proof. From (4) in Theorem A.12, we know that the probability that the minimum improvement
in a fixed BR sequence of length 5nk is at most ǫ, is at most
∑5nk
ℓ=1
(
2n2k3(φǫ)1/(10k log(nk))
)l
.
Applying Theorem B.1, for N = nk and Λ ≤ kn, we get f(N) = O(1), N r+β ≤ N3, and
g(N) = O(k log(nk)), and the result follows.
Corollary B.3. For complete graphs, the smoothed expected time for BR to terminate for network-
coordination games is polynomial in (nk, φ).
Proof. From (3) in Lemma A.9, for the case of complete graphs when a BR sequence has all active
players, we have:
Pr[∆(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
(
k3kn2kφǫ
)n/
φǫ ≤
n∑
i=1
(
k3kn2kφ1/2ǫ1/2
)i/
φǫ.
Similarly, from (A.1.3) in Lemma A.9, the probability that the minimum improvement in a BR
sequence of length 2nk is at most ǫ, is given by:
Pr[∆(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤
n∑
p=1
2
(
(100φ2n3k4)kǫ1/4
)p
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Combining these sums, we get the probability that a BR sequence of length 2nk has improvement
at most ǫ is:
Pr[∆(p) ∈ (0, ǫ)] ≤ max

n∑
p=1
2
(
(100φ2n3k5)kǫ1/4
)p
,
n∑
i=1
(
k3kn2kφ1/2ǫ1/2
)i
≤
n∑
j=1
((φc1(nk)
c2k(φǫ)1/c3)j .
Applying Theorem B.1, for N = nk, N r+β ≤ N3, and Λ ≤ kn, we get f(N) = O(1) and
g(N) = O(1), and the result follows.
C Smoothness-Preserving Reduction to 1- and 2-FlipMaxCut
Recall Definition 2.2 in Section 3, where we have defined a notion of Strong and Weak smoothness
preserving reductions. As a reminder, search problem P is reduced to Q if random instances of
P may be reduced to random instances of Q in such a way that the independence of the random
inputs and the bounds on their density are preserved. The reduction is strong if independent
random parameters in P produce independent random inputs to the reduced problem, and weak if
the reduced parameters are instead linear combinations of independent random variables.
Recall from Definition 2.2 the d-FlipMaxCut problem of finding a cut in a weighted graph such
that the value of the cut cannot be improved by performing up to d flips. In this section, we
wish to provide a weak reduction from instances of k-NetCoordNash to 2-FlipMaxCut. Solving
the smoothed complexity of 2-FlipMaxCut is still an open problem, but it is not unlikely that it
matches that of 1-FlipMaxCut, namely, quasi-polynomial smoothed complexity on arbitrary graphs,
and polynomial smoothed complexity on complete graphs. We will show that, if this were true,
then this implies the same would hold for k-NetCoordNash, independently of the value of k.
We first show that a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut on (arbitrary)
complete graphs implies (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity.
Theorem C.1. Let Q be a search problem with (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity, as defined
above. Let P be a problem which admits a strong smoothness-preserving reduction to Q, given by
f1, f2, f3, as in Definition 2.2. Then P has (quasi)polynomial smoothed complexity.
Proof. The algorithm for instances of P is as follows:
1) Perform the randomized reduction,
2) Run the smoothed-(quasi-)polynomial-time algorithm for Q on the reduced instance,
3) Compute the solution to the instance of P given the solution to the reduced problem.
By the definition of smoothness-preserving reductions and (quasi-)polynomial smoothed com-
plexity, step (2) will always correctly solve the reduced instance in finite time, and therefore step
(3) will output a correct solution to the instance of P.
It remains then to show that the algorithm runs in polynomial time with high probability, which
we do via Markov’s inequality. Let (I,X) be an arbitrary instance of P where I is fixed, and X is a
random vector whose entries have density at most φ. Let R be a random vector whose density is at
most φ, and φ′ be the bound on the density of the reduced random input f2(X,R). Finally, let A be
the algorithm that solves instances of Q efficiently with high probability. Suppose that on random
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input
(
f1(I), f2(X,R)
)
, A runs in time (φ′|I||X|)c with probability 1−1/|I|c′ taken over the random
input (X,R), where |X| is the size of X. Then we wish to show that A runs in time (φ′|I||X|)c
on input
(
f1(I), f2(X,R)
)
, with high probability over the input vector X. To this end, we define
the indicator function B(I,X,R) which, for fixed values of I, X, and R, indicates whether A takes
time greater than (φ′|I||X|)c. Thus, we wish to bound PrX [B(I,X,R) = 1] = EX [B(I,X,R)] for
all I fixed, and for R random. Letting δ = 1/|I|c′ , we have
Pr
X
[
Pr
R
[B(I,X,R) = 1] ≥
√
δ
]
= Pr
X
[
E[B(I,X,R)|X] ≥
√
δ
]
(Markov’s Inequality) ≤ EX
[
ER[B(I,X,R)|X]
]
√
δ
(Law of Total Expectation) = EX,R[B(I,X,R)]/
√
δ
(by assumption) ≤ δ/
√
δ =
√
δ
Therefore, with probability 1−1/|I|c′/2, the algorithm A will solve the reduced instance in (quasi-)
polynomial time. Since the values of φ′, |f1(I)| and |f2(X,R)| are all assumed to be polynomial
in φ, |I|, and |X|, then the values c, c′ can be assumed to be constants (or logarithmic, in the
quasi-polynomial case), and we have our desired result.
Corollary C.2. Let P be a problem which admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-
max-cut on an (arbitrary) complete graph, then P has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed
complexity.
Proof. It suffices to show that local-max-cut has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed com-
plexity on (arbitrary) complete graphs, when the edge weights are full-rank linear combinations of
independent random variables. This allows us to conclude, following the proof method of the previ-
ous lemma, that the reduction implies (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity for P. To see this,
we observe that the analyses of Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Angel et al. [2017] reduce to applying
Lemma A.1 to a high-rank collection of integer vectors, exactly as we have done in Sections A and
B. Furthermore, 〈α,MX〉 = 〈MTα,X〉 for any square matrix M . Therefore, we may restate the
lemma as:
Claim C.3. Let X ∈ Rd be a vector of d independent random variables where each Xi has density
bounded by φ. Let α1, . . . , αr be r linearly independent vectors in Z
d, and M a full rank matrix in
Rd×d with |Mi,j | ≥ η > 0 for all i, j such that Mi,j 6= 0. then the joint density of (〈αi,MX〉)i∈[k] is
bounded by (φ/η)r. In particular, for all b1, b2, . . . ∈ R, and ǫ > 0,
Pr
[∧r
i=1 〈αi,MX〉 ∈ [bi, bi + ǫ]
]
≤ (φǫ/η)r
The only difference is the addition of the matrixM . Note that as X is a vector of d independent
random variables and M is a full rank matrix, the product MX is also a vector of d independent
random variables. Further, as every element of X has density bounded by φ, and every entry of M
is at least η, every element of the product MX has density bounded by φ/η. Hence, by applying
the analysis to MX instead of X, the proof of the claim easily follows from that of Lemma A.1.
We conclude that the smoothed (quasi-polynomial) polynomial complexity for local-max-cut on
(arbitrary) complete graphs from Etscheid and Ro¨glin [2017], Angel et al. [2017] does not require
edge-weights to be independent, but instead, it suffices to have edge weights which are full-rank,
linear combinations of independent random variables, where the non-zero entries ofM are bounded
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away from 0. Since the smoothed analysis of local-max-cut needs ǫ to be 1/poly(|X|, φ), it suffices
to have η ≥ 1/poly(φ, |X|).
The rest of the analysis is identical to that of Theorem C.1, where A is the FLIP algorithm.
We note that if it were possible to weakly reduce k-NetCoordNash to 1-FlipMaxCut, then
this would imply a (quasi-)polynomial smoothed complexity for k-NetCoordNash, where the de-
gree of the polynomial does not depend on k. Unfortunately, we only achieve a weak reduction
to 2-FlipMaxCut, which is likely to have similar smoothed complexity to 1-FlipMaxCut, though
this is not as of yet known. We leave the smoothed analysis of 2-FlipMaxCut, and therefore of
NetCoordNash for k variable, as an open problem.
Theorem C.4. The problem of finding a Nash Equilibrium in a Network Coordination Game with
k strategies (k-NetCoordNash) admits a weak smoothness-preserving reduction to local-max-cut up
to two-flips (2-FlipMaxCut). Furthermore, 2-NetCoordNash reduces to 1-FlipMaxCut.
Proof. Assume, first, that the payoff values of the coordination game are supported in [0.5, 1]. If
the input is assumed to have been supported on [−1, 1], then this is simply an affine transformation
of the input, and at most quadruples the maximum density. The idea of the reduction is to set up
a graph such that every “good” cut can be mapped to a strategy profile, the total cut values of
these “good” cuts are equivalent to the payoff of the associated strategy profile, and every locally
maximal cut must be a “good” cut. Recall that the definition of smoothness-preserving reduction
allows for extra randomness to be introduced. We will use this randomness to ensure that these
conditions hold, and that the edge weights are simply a full-rank, integer combination of the payoff
values and the extra random variables. Since the cut graph topology is only a function of the game
graph topology, and the edge weights are only a function of the input payoff values and the extra
random variables, this will be a valid reduction. It will suffice to argue that the density bound does
not blow up, and that local max cuts optimal up to two flips are exactly those “good” cuts which
are mapped to PNE strategy profiles.
In this proof, the total payoff function for a strategy profile σ will be considered as
payoff(σ) =
∑
u
payoffu(σ) = 2
∑
uv∈E
Auv(σu, σv)
which is double the potential function considered in the previous sections. This will be necessary
to ensure that the linear system has integer entries. To have our payoff value be equal to that of
the standard potential function, it suffices to halve the payoff values, which at most doubles the
density of the random variables. (Alternatively, we may set η = 12 in the proof of Theorem C.1.)
The reduction is as follows: given an instance of k-NetCoordNash on game graphG, we construct
a graph with nk + 2 nodes: two terminal nodes s and t, and nk nodes indexed by player-strategy
pairs (u, i). Nodes s and t are connected to every other node in the graph, and for each player u
and strategy i, there is an edge from node (u, i) to node (u, j) for all j 6= i. Furthermore, if players
u and v share an edge in the game graph (i.e. play a game together), there is also an edge from
(u, i) to (v, j) for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Therefore, the cut graph is complete if and only if the game
graph is.
Call a cut S, T valid if it is an s-t cut with s ∈ S and t ∈ T , and S contains at most one
node (u, i) for each player u. Now, for any valid s-t cut, we can interpret this cut as determining
a strategy profile as follows: If player u appears in S paired with strategy i, then set σu = i.
Otherwise, set σu = 0, a “dummy” strategy with bad payoff. Call this profile σ(S). We wish to
34
choose edge weights such that all locally maximal cuts are valid cuts, and also such that for any
valid cut S, the total cut value is equal to payoff(σ(S)). We denote as A((u, i)(v, j)) the payoff value
for the uv game, when player u plays strategy 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and player v plays strategy 0 ≤ j ≤ k.
This is simply to disambiguate the Auv(i, j) notation. We will, however, use this latter notation
when space does not permit the former. Letting 0 denote the dummy strategy, we assume that
A((u, i)(v, 0)) = Y (u, i) for all v 6= u, and A((u, 0)(v, 0)) = A0 for all u 6= v, where the underlined
values denote new random variables which are not given by the instance of k-NetCoordNash.
Since the variables A0 and Y (u, i) are in our control, we assume that they are drawn inde-
pendently at random, and are supported on [0, 0.5). This ensures that any Nash Equilibrium
must entirely consist of non-zero strategies, since we have assumed A((u, i)(v, j)) ∈ [0.5, 1] for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. To minimize the density of the new random variables, we may assume that the distri-
bution is uniform. For the purposes of the cut graph, we will also need random variables W (u, i)
for all players u and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and R(u, ij) for all u and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. We assume the W and R
variables to be i.i.d. uniform random variables over [−1, 0).
Denote as δ : 2V
′ → R is the cut function, where δ(S) := ∑
uv∈E′:
u∈S,v/∈S
w(uv). Furthermore, for sim-
plicity of notation, let π({(u1, i1), . . . , (uℓ, iℓ)}) denote the value: payoff
(
σ
({s, (u1, i1), . . . , (uℓ, iℓ)})),
where π stands for “payoff.” We wish to choose edge weights w such that
(i) For every valid cut S, T , δ(S) = payoff(σ(S)) = π(S \ {s}),
(ii) for every player u and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, δ({s, (u, i), (u, j)}) = 2R(u, ij),
(iii) and for every pair (u, i) ∈ S, w((s, (u, i))) =W (u, i).
The rest of the proof is contained in the 3 following claims, which we will prove at the end of
this section:
Claim C.5. Condition (i) is satisfied if and only if (a) δ({s, (u, i)}) = π({(u, i)}) for all players u
and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and (b) w((u, i), (v, j)) = Y (u, i) − Y (v, j) −A((u, i)(v, j)) −A0.
Claim C.6. The edge weights w(u, v) which satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are full-rank,
square, integer-valued, linear combinations of the random variables Auv(i, j), Y (u, i), A0, R(u, ij),
and W (u, i).
Claim C.7. If conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisfied, then all local-max-cuts up to 2 flips are
valid cuts, and their associated strategy profiles are Nash equilibria.
Thus, we have provided a reduction from an instance of k-NetCoordNash to an instance of 2-
FlipMaxCut, such that any solution to the reduced instance of 2-FlipMaxCut directly translates to
a solution to the original instance of k-NetCoordNash, the edge weights of the cut graph are a full-
rank linear combination of the game payoff values and the extra random variables, and the linear
combinations are integral. Therefore, we have provided a weak smoothness-preserving reduction
from k-NetCoordNash on complete (resp. arbitrary) game graphs to 2-FlipMaxCut on complete
(arbitrary) graphs.
In the case k = 2, we slightly modify the reduction to not include a dummy strategy. Simply
create a graph on n + 2 nodes labeled as s, t, and one for each player in the Network Game. We
say that every s-t cut S, T is valid, and define σ(S) as setting σu = 1 if u ∈ S, and σu = 2 if u ∈ T .
Then w(s, u) = W (u), w(u, v) = A((u, 1)(v, 2)) + A((u, 2)(v, 1)) − A((u, 1)(v, 1)) − A((u, 2)(v, 2)),
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and the rest of the proof goes through. Since the default (“no node selected”) strategy is one of
the two possible strategies, every local max cut up to 1 flip must map to a PNE, as desired.
Corollary C.8. If 2-FlipMaxCut has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity on (ar-
bitrary) complete graphs when inputs are linearly independent combinations of independent random
variables, then NetCoordNash has (quasi-polynomial) polynomial smoothed complexity on (arbi-
trary) complete game graphs for k in the input, rather than for fixed k.
We leave as an open problem the smoothed complexity of 2-FlipMaxCut. Below are presented
the proofs of the claims necessary for Theorem C.4
Proof of Claim C.5: Condition (i) is satisfied if and only if (a) δ({s, (u, i)}) = π({(u, i)}) for all
players u and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and (b) w((u, i), (v, j)) = A((u, i)(v, j)) +A0 − Y (u, i) − Y (v, j).
We begin by showing the two following equalities:
π({(u1, i1), . . . , (uℓ, iℓ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
S′
) =
[ ℓ∑
j=1
π({(uj , ij)})
]
− (ℓ− 1)π(∅)
−
∑
(u,i),(v,j)∈S
uv∈E
2 [Auv(i, 0) +Auv(0, j) −Auv(0, 0) −Auv(i, j)] (5)
δ({s, (u1, i1), . . . , (uℓ, iℓ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
) =
[ ℓ∑
j=1
δ({s, (uj , ij)})
]
− (ℓ− 1)δ({s})
−
∑
(u,i),(v,j)∈S
uv∈E
2w((u, i), (v, j)) (6)
For (5), note first if there is no uv edge in the game graph, then Auv does not appear on either
side of the equality, and we may restrict our attention to pairs which form game edges. Now, for
every v and w which do not appear in S, the left-hand-side has 2Avw(0, 0), and the right-hand-
side has 2(ℓ − (ℓ − 1))Avw(0, 0) from the first line. If u appears with strategy i, and v does not
appear in S, then the left-hand-side has 2Auv(i, 0), and the right-hand-side has 2Auv(i, 0) from the
π({(u, i)}) term. If u appears with strategy i, and v appears with strategy j, then the left-hand-
side has 2Auv(i, j), and the right-hand-side has 2Auv(i, 0) and 2Auv(0, j) from the π({(u, i)}) and
π({(v, j)}) terms which are canceled out by the second line, 2(ℓ− 2− (ℓ− 1))Auv(0, 0) terms from
the first line which is canceled out by the second line, and the term 2Auv(i, j) from the second line.
A similar argument shows the validity of (6). Since condition (i) requires that π({u, i}) =
δ({s, (u, i)}), this is necessary. In the case ℓ = 2, this implies that w((u, i)(v, j)) must be equal to
Auv(i, 0) + Auv(0, j) − Auv(0, 0) − Auv(i, j) = Y (u, i) + Y (u, j) − A0 − Auv(i, j). Finally, setting
w((u, i)(v, j)) to this value fulfills condition (i) for all values of ℓ, as desired.
Proof of Claim C.6: The edge weights which satisfy conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are a full-rank,
square, integer-valued, linear combination of the random variables Auv(i, j), Y (u, i), A0, R(u, i, j),
and W (u, i) for all choices of u, v, i, j.
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The previous claim allows us to set up the following system:
w(s, (u, i)) =W (u, i) (7)
w((u, i)(v, j)) = Y (u, i) + Y (v, j) −Auv(i, j) −A0 (8)
π(∅) = δ({s}) = w(s, t) +
∑
u∈V
k∑
i=1
W (u, i)
=⇒ w(s, t) = π(∅)−
∑
u∈V
k∑
i=1
W (u, i) (9)
2R(u, ij) = δ({s, (u, i), (u, j)}) = δ({s, (u, i)}) + δ({s, (u, j)}) − δ({s}) − 2w((u, i)(u, j))
=⇒ w((u, i)(u, j)) = 12
(
π({(u, i)}) + π({(u, j)}) − π(∅)− 2R(u, i, j) ) (10)
π({(u, i)}) = δ({s, (u, i)}) = w(s, t) + w((u, i), t) +
∑
(v,j)6=(u,i)
[W (v, j) + w((u, i)(v, j))]
=⇒ w((u, i), t) = π({(u, i}) − w(s, t)−
∑
(u,i)6=(v,j)
[W (v, j) + w((u, i)(v, j))]
= π({(u, i}) − π(∅) +W (u, i)−
∑
(u,i)6=(v,j)
w((u, i)(v, j)) (11)
We observe first that (11) adds the values of the previous numbered equations to the value of
w((u, i), t). Therefore, it suffices to perform simple row-elimination to get ŵ((u, i), t) = π({u, i})−∑
W (v, j). Now, let G = (V,E) be the underlying game graph, and let d(u) be the number of
games that player u participates in, i.e. the degree of u in the game graph. Then π(∅) = 2|E|A0,
and π({(u, i)}) = π(∅) + 2d(u)[Y (u, i) −A0]. Finally, we have
...
w((u, i)(v, j))
...
...
w((u, i)(u, j))
...
...
ŵ((u, i), t)
...
w(s, t)
...
w(s, (u, i))
...

=

−Id 0 ∗ −1 0
0 −Id ∗ ∗ 0
0 0 2d(u)Id ∗ Id
0 0 0 2|E| −1
0 0 0 0 Id


...
Auv(i, j)
...
...
R(u, i, j)
...
...
Y (u, i)
...
A0
...
W (u, i)
...

(12)
It is easy to check that the ∗ values are integral, since the π values must be even combinations
of the A values. Therefore, after the row-operations leading to ŵ((u, i), t) values, the matrix is
upper-triangular, which implies that the system is full-rank, square, and integral, as desired.
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Proof of Claim C.7: If conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisfied, then all local-max-cuts up to 2
flips are valid cuts, and their associated strategy profiles are Nash equilibria.
Recall that we have assumed that 0.5 ≤ Auv(i, j) ≤ 1 for all edges uv and for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k,
that 0 ≤ A0, Y (u, i) < 0.5 for all players u and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and that −1 ≤ R(u, ij),W (u, i) < 0 for
all players u and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
We wish to show, first, that any local max cut must be an s-t cut. Without loss of generality,
assume that all cuts considered do not include t, since it suffices to take the complement of the
cut set. Thus, it suffices to argue that for any set S of vertices containing neither s nor t, that
δ(S ∪ {s}) − δ(S) > 0. The two cuts may only differ on edges incident to s. The positive term
includes w(s, t) and W (u, i) for all (u, i) /∈ S, and the negative term includes W (u, i) for all
(u, i) ∈ S. However, we know from (9) that w(s, t) = π(∅)−∑(u,i)W (u, i). Therefore, we get
δ(S ∪ {s})− δ(S) = 2|E| A0︸︷︷︸
≥0
− 2
∑
(u,i)∈S
W (u, i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
Now, it remains to show that any locally optimal s-t cut must be valid. It is well known that
cut functions in undirected graphs are submodular, and therefore for any S not containing s, (u, i),
or (u, j),
δ(S∪{s, (u, i), (u, j)}) − δ(S ∪ {s, (u, i)})
≤ δ({s, (u, i), (u, j)}) − δ({s, (u, i)})
= 2R(u, i, j) − 2(|E| − d(u))A0 − 2d(u)Y (u, i)
< 0
Thus, conditions (ii) and (iii) are sufficient to guarantee that all local max cuts are valid cuts, and
therefore local max cuts up to 2 flips must also be valid cuts. Condition (i) implies that the value
of a valid cut is equal to its associated strategy profile. However, for any strategy profile σ, if S is
the valid cut associated to σ, and player u benefits from replacing σ(u) with i′, then this implies
that S − (u, σ(u)) + (u, i′) is a cut with greater value, which is a 2-flip move. Therefore, S can
only be a max-cut up to 2 flips if its associated strategy profile forms a Nash Equilibrium, and by
construction, this strategy profile must consist of non-zero strategies.
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